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INTRODUCTION
In light of the present economic crisis and their role in it, the world
seems suddenly keen to know more about the handful of private
corporations-variously known as bond rating agencies, credit rating
agencies, credit rating organizations (CROs), or the like-that rate the
creditworthiness of corporate and government debt securities. By most
accounts, these companies hold extensive sway in public capital markets,
and for about thirty years, a few of them have enjoyed literally de jure
delegation of federal regulatory oversight over much of the U.S. financial
sector. With that power their ratings have value regardless of their
accuracy, and they have used this power to earn substantial profits. The
regulatory use of credit ratings is particularly troubling because the CROs
have been implicated in some of that sector's worst problems and, by most
accounts, were intimately tied up in the present mess.
Despite the CROs' privileged status, they have never been especially
popular with observers, and during the past several years, they have
increasingly been blamed for financial-sector failures. In particular, they
have been blamed for failing to warn of major bond defaults since at least
the mid-1970s, the calamitous losses throughout the 1990s associated with
various derivative products, and the corporate collapses of 2001 and 2002.'
Some observers see them as actively complicit in the current meltdown in
1. See infra notes 9, 53-54 and accompanying text (recounting the numerous alleged
failings of CROs).
[61:3
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structured finance.2  Possibly for the first time, CRO insiders are now
blowing the whistle on what appears to have been significant internal
wrongdoing.
A flurry of U.S. government investigation has surrounded the CROs
during the past two decades, 4 and overseas they are under scrutiny by
2. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
3. Notably, two former high-level executives of the ratings firm Standard & Poor's
(S&P), Frank Raiter and Richard Gugliada, spoke candidly with documentary news
reporters acknowledging that while the CROs could not meaningfully predict the soundness
of many structured products, they rated them anyway because rating them was so profitable.
NOW: Credit and Credibility (PBS television broadcast Dec. 26, 2008) (transcript available
at http://www.pbs.org/now/shows/446/transcript.html). Raiter, in particular, confided that
his entire department of analytical experts believed that some structured financc ratings
were "guess[es]" and doubted that some of them could really be making money at all
"because the general premise to some of us behind what [these products] were-was a
mystery." Id. Their accounts are supported by anecdotal but fairly glaring evidence turned
up by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) staff in 2008, which included internal
correspondence among analysts at the CROs indicating their doubts about their ratings of
structured products, as well as evidence of substantial pecuniary conflicts of interest
affecting analytical personnel. See SEC, SUMMARY REPORT OF ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE
COMMISSION STAFF'S EXAMINATIONS OF SELECT CREDIT RATING AGENCIES (2008), available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/craexaminationO7OO8.pdf [hereinafter SEC 2008
STAFF REPORT].
4. Congress and the SEC have been investigating the CROs off and on since at least
the late 1980s. With the exception of the light regulatory touch applied in legislation and
rules that took effect in mid-2007, the chief result of all that work was just published
criticism of the agencies. In light of the recent crisis and their apparently central role in it,
both Congress and the SEC have recently undertaken major new regulatory steps. First, the
Congressional Oversight Panel, a commission of outside experts established by the Troubled
Asset Relief Program (TARP) legislation, recently released a report scathingly critical of
deregulation and reliance on private-sector forces to constrain risk. See CONG. OVERSIGHT
PANEL, SPECIAL REPORT ON REGULATORY REFORM: MODERNIZING THE AMERICAN FINANCIAL
REGULATORY SYSTEM; RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING OVERSIGHT, PROTECTING
CONSUMERS, AND ENSURING STABILITY (2009), available at
http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-012909-report-regulatoryreform.pdf [hereinafter COP
REPORT 2009]. Among other things, the report recommends creation of a government Credit
Rating Review Board that would audit ratings and actively oversee the CROs. Id. at 44.
The SEC also undertook a major investigation of the CROs' practices immediately after the
beginning of the subprime meltdown, producing one of the best exposes of the CROs' inner
workings, especially of their function during the structured finance era. See SEC, REPORT
ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN THE OPERATION OF THE
SECURITIES MARKETS (2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/credratingreport0l03.pdf. The SEC has also issued a new
set of proposed rules that, although still pending, appear to be more invasive than anything
undertaken before. See Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 73 Fed.
Reg. 36,212 (proposed June 25, 2008) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249b)
(enhancing the disclosure and comparability of credit rating performance statistics).
Until recently, state governments have mainly stayed out of the CROs' affairs, with
the limited exception that state tort claims have sometimes been asserted by disappointed
investors and issuers. See infra note 179 .and accompanying text. In light of the recent
crisis, however, the Attorney General of Connecticut has sued the CROs in antitrust on
behalf of Connecticut municipalities injured by the ratings process for their debt issues. See
infra note 9. Further, the Attorneys General of Ohio and New York have both begun
investigations of the CROs' role in both subprime lending abuses and the larger credit crisis
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several intergovernmental 5 and nongovernmental organizations. 6 Much of
generally. See Katie Benner & Adam Lashinsky, Subprime Contagion?, FORTUNE, July 23,
2007, available at http://money.cnn.com/2007/07/05/news/economy/subprime.fortune/
index.htm?postversion=2007070511; Press Release, Conn. Attorney General's Office,
Attorney General Says His Broader Investigation into Credit Rating Agencies Continuing
Aggressively (June 5, 2008), http://www.ct.gov/ag/cwp/view.asp?A=2795&Q=416772;
Press Release, Office of the Attorney General of N.Y., Attorney General Cuomo Announces
Landmark Reform Agreements with the Nation's Three Principal Credit Rating Agencies
(June 5, 2008), http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media center/2008/jun/june5a_08.html.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has been a frequent critic, and a
harsh one lately. See Gov. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FINANCIAL REGULATION: A
FRAMEWORK FOR CRAFTING AND ASSESSING PROPOSALS TO MODERNIZE THE OUTDATED U.S.
FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM 30-32 (2009), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09216.pdf (asserting that the existing regulatory system has
failed to identify and manage the risks associated with CROs). More generally, GAO has
argued since at least the early 1990s that U.S. financial regulation is dangerously
fragmented and uncoordinated, and has repeatedly urged various reforms, although to little
avail. See generally Gov. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FINANCIAL REGULATION: INDUSTRY
TRENDS CONTINUE TO CHALLENGE THE FEDERAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE (2007), available
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0832.pdf, Gov. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FINANCIAL
REGULATION: INDUSTRY CHANGES PROMPT NEED TO RECONSIDER U.S. REGULATORY
STRUCTURE (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0561.pdf; Testimony
Before the Comm. on Banking and Financial Servs., 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of
James L. Bothwell, Director, Financial Institutions and Markets Issues, General Government
Division, Government Accountability Office), available at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/gg96117t.pdf; Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Capital
Markets, Securities and GSEs, House Comm. on Banking and Financial Servs., 104th Cong.
(1995) (statement of James L. Bothwell, Director, Financial Institutions and Markets Issues,
General Government Division, Government Accountability Office), available at
http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbatl/154163.pdf.
5. Several intergovernmental coalitions have taken acute interest in the CROs,
especially in the wake of the present crisis. The thrust of their efforts has been to develop a
body of hortatory guidance to better contain the CROs' misbehavior, mostly consisting of
structural tweaks and disclosure rules to improve transparency.
There are a few important recent efforts. First, an April 2008 report of the
Financial Stability Forum (FSF), a task force of the Group of Seven finance ministers,
placed CROs at the heart of the crisis, particularly for their role in structured finance
products. The FSF recommended substantially revised ratings methodologies and conduct
standards, and recommended reconsideration of the use of CROs' ratings in regulation.
These recommendations were in addition to a raft of other recommendations to improve
system-wide transparency and risk management. See FIN. STABILITY FORUM, REPORT OF
THE FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM ON ENHANCING MARKET AND INSTITUTIONAL RESILIENCE
5-11, 32-39 (2008), available at http://www.fsforum.org/publications/r.0804.pdf
[hereinafter FSF 2008 REPORT] (discussing the underlying causes and weaknesses and
recommendations to address them). Second, an international consortium of regulators, the
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), first attempted to address
some of the CROs' problems in 2004 and then studied the problem anew in the wake of the
credit crisis. See TECHNICAL COMM., INT'L ORG. OF SECS. COMM'NS, CODE OF CONDUCT
FUNDAMENTALS FOR CREDIT RATING AGENCIES (2004), available at
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD180.pdf, for the initial report. See
TECHNICAL COMM., INT'L ORG. OF SECS. COMM'NS, THE ROLE OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES
IN STRUCTURED FINANCE MARKETS: FINAL REPORT (2008), available at
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD270.pdf, for the final report. Third, the
Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR), a task force of European Union
regulators set up to advise the European Commission (EC), has actively monitored the
[61:3
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the domestic soul-searching has been driven by the outright delegation of
federal regulatory power and virtually nonexistent legal oversight.7 Aside
from a fleeting and uneventful antitrust investigation in the late 1990s,8 the
CROs for years, but so far has only urged that CROs voluntarily adopt the CROs' code of
conduct. CESR has affirmatively urged the EC not to regulate the CROs. See COMM. OF
EUROPEAN SECS. REGULATORS, CESR's TECHNICAL ADVICE TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
ON POSSIBLE MEASURES CONCERNING CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 52 (2005), available at
http://www.cesr.eu. Fourth, the Bank for International Settlements' Basel Committee has
studied the CROs fairly extensively and recommended reforms. See COMM. ON THE GLOBAL
FIN. SYS., BANK FOR INT'L SETrLEMENTS, THE ROLE OF RATINGS IN STRUCTURED FINANCE:
ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS (2005), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs23.pdf
[hereinafter BIS STRUCTURED FINANCE REPORT]. But more ominously, the Bank's Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel Committee), whose guidance efforts have
largely laid the foundation for current capital market structure, has recommended
international adoption of the American model of credit assessment. As will be explained
more fully later in this Article, for many years U.S. regulation has made use of CROs'
ratings by incorporating them by reference in a variety of mandatory rules imposed on
financial institutions. The Basel accord currently in force contemplates adopting such a
system worldwide. The Basel Committee's approach, inasmuch as it invites all the
problems of the American one, has been the focus of harsh criticism. See, e.g., Lawrence J.
White, The Credit Rating Industry: An Industrial Organization Analysis, in RATINGS,
RATING AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 41 (Richard M. Levich et al. eds.,
2002).
Some other international efforts have addressed the CROs but with somewhat
different purposes and likely effects. For example, the Association of South East Asian
Nations (ASEAN) Forum on Credit Rating Agencies, an intergovernmental group of South
Asian countries, adopted a hortatory code of ethics for CROs in those countries, but the
code seems mainly driven by the countries' desire to grow domestic ratings industries. The
code evinces little concern for investors or substantive quality. See TIMOTHY J. SINCLAIR,
THE NEW MASTERS OF CAPITAL: AMERICAN BOND RATING AGENCIES AND THE POLITICS OF
CREDITWORTHINESS 125-26 (2005).
6. Notably, the International Group of Treasury Associations (IGTA), a coalition of a
few dozen national trade associations for corporate finance professionals, collectively
representing tens of thousands of financial managers on both the buyer and issuer sides, has
lobbied the SEC for some time for stricter regulation of CROs. See Press Release, Ass'n for
Fin. Prof'ls, Thirty International Treasurers Organizations Urge SEC to Act Now on Credit
Rating Agency Reform (Dec. 8, 2004),
http://www.afponline.org/pub/pr/2004/pr_-20041208-igta.html. IGTA, along with its
member organizations from the United States, United Kingdom, and France, has also
developed a hortatory ethical code for CROs. See ASS'N FOR CORPORATE TREASURERS ET
AL., CODE OF STANDARD PRACTICES FOR PARTICIPANTS IN THE CREDIT RATING PROCESS
(2005), available at http://www.afponline.org/pub/pdf/CSP-final.pdf. The drafters noted
their general support for the previously issued IOSCO Code, and intend the IGTA Code to
be a complement to the IOSCO Code. Id. at vii-viii.
7. See infra notes 24-32 and accompanying text (discussing the CROs' role in federal
regulation of securities and banking markets).
8. The Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice has long had an eye on the
CROs and formally investigated Moody's in the late 1990s on suspicion that it penalized
issuers who used other services by issuing them unsolicited and improperly low ratings.
The Antitrust Division ended its inquiry in 1999 without taking any antitrust action. See
Charles Gasparino, Inquiry into Moody's Ratings Practices Ends as U.S. Agency Takes No
Action, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 1999, at A4. Though an antitrust suit was not filed, Moody's
pleaded guilty in 2001 to obstruction of justice in that investigation, admitting that it
destroyed damning documents relevant to the investigation. Moody's paid nearly $200,000
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federal government never directly regulated the powerful, hundred-year-old
industry until June 2007. However, even the 2007 effort imposed virtually
no constraints. 9
Current circumstances have shaken faith in the CROs, and the question
seems not whether the regulatory approach will change, but only how
much, in what ways, and with what consequences. Several academic
endeavors are afoot to understand the CROs better, l° and many of them
and agreed to three executive resignations to settle the matter. See Queena Sook Kim,
Moody's Pleads Guilty to Destroying Documents During Antitrust Investigation, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 11, 2001, at B8. Moody's conduct also resulted in unsuccessful antitrust litigation
by an issuer that claimed Moody's penalized it with a lowered bond rating when the issuer
chose to use a lower priced CRO. See Jefferson County Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody's
Investor's Servs., Inc., 175 F.3d 848 (10th Cir. 1999). Late last year, apparently in response
to the meltdown in subprime mortgage-backed securities, Connecticut's Attorney General
opened a new investigation, which focused on the CROs' alleged ability to charge
supracompetitive prices to Connecticut municipal bond issuers for ratings services. See
Rupini Bergstrom, Bond Raters Get Subpoenas: Connecticut Presses Antitrust Inquiry;
Firms Cooperating, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27-28, 2007, at B2. In July 2008, the investigation
resulted in the first of several planned suits against the CROs. See Press Release, Conn.
Attorney General's Office, Attorney General Sues Credit Rating Agencies for Illegally
Giving Municipalities Lower Ratings, Costing Taxpayers Millions (July 30, 2008),
http://www.ct.gov/ag/cwp/view.asp?a=2795&q=420390.
9. After years of study and agitation, Congress finally adopted legislation to regulate
the CROs in 2006. See Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, §
4(a), 120 Stat. 1329 (2006) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (2006)). The Credit Rating
Agency Reform Act of 2006 (CRARA) was adopted explicitly in response to the collapse of
Enron and other corporate failures in 2001 and 2002, and to the CROs' perceived role in
them. See S. REP. No. 109-326, at 1-2 (2006), reprinted in 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. 865, 865-
66. Because CRARA depends on voluntary registration, it had little real effect before its
implementation by SEC rules in June 2007. See Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies
Registered as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 72 Fed. Reg. 33,564
(June 18, 2007) (adopting implementing regulations and making them effective as of June
2007). Currently pending new CRARA rules, which were quickly proposed after the
subprime meltdown, are admittedly more invasive. See supra note 4.
10. See, e.g., John Ammer & Nathanael Clinton, The Impact of Credit Rating Changes
on the Pricing of Asset-Backed Securities, in STRUCTURED CREDIT PRODUCTS: PRICING,
RATING, RISK MANAGEMENT AND BASEL II 159 (William Perraudin ed., 2004); Frank
Partnoy, The Paradox of Credit Ratings, in RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL
FINANCIAL SYSTEM 65 (Richard M. Levich et al. eds., 2002) ; Konan Chan & Narasimhan
Jegadeesh, Market-Based Evaluation for Models to Predict Bond Ratings, 7 REV. PAC.
BASIN FIN. MARKETS & POLICIES 153 (2004); Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies,
82 WASH. U. L.Q. 43 (2004); St6phane Rousseau, Enhancing the Accountability of Credit
Rating Agencies: The Case for a Disclosure-Based Approach, 51 MCGILL L.J. 617 (2006);
Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox,
2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1; Patrick Bolton et al., The Credit Ratings Game (Nat'l Bureau Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 14712, 2009); Daniel M. Covitz & Paul Harrison, Testing
Conflicts of Interest at Bond Ratings Agencies with Market Anticipation: Evidence that
Reputation Incentives Dominate (Fed. Reserve Bd., Working Paper, 2003); Jeffrey Manns,
Rating Risk After the Subprime Mortgage Crisis: A User Fee Approach for Rating Agency
Accountability, 8 N.C. L. REV. 1011 (2009); Joseph R. Mason & Joshua Rosner, Where Did
the Aisk Go? How Misapplied Bond Ratings Cause Mortgage Backed Securities and
Collateralized Debt Obligation Market Disruptions (Soc. Sci. Research Network, Working
Paper No. 1027475, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=-1027475; Vasiliki Skreta &
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recommend fairly strong regulatory medicine."1 While this activity comes
with a renewed vigor, it also comes against a long history of study
concerning the CROs 12 and financial-market gatekeepers more generally,
13
much of which had already been fairly skeptical about those institutions.
14
Nevertheless, as recently as late 2007, influential observers still argued that
CROs did not need oversight because they were already effectively
regulated by market forces. 15
Laura Veldkamp, Ratings Shopping and Asset Complexity: A Theory of Ratings Inflation
(Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper, 2009), available at
www.nber.org/papers/w14761; Lawrence J. White, Good Intentions Gone Awry: A Policy
Analysis of the SEC's Regulation of the Bond Rating Industry (N.Y. Univ. Law & Econs.
Working Papers, Paper No. 69, 2006).
11. The best known suggestion is from Frank Partnoy's influential early article, which
calls for removal of all regulatory reliance on the CROs' ratings, and instead recommends
using market generated "credit spreads" as measures of risk. See Frank Partnoy, The Siskel
and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77
WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 704-07 (1999). Less-stark suggestions come in many varieties, usually
calling for retention of the Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO)
designation, but with mandatory registration, some light oversight, and increased
competition. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 10; Rousseau, supra note 10; Manns, supra note 10.
One interesting suggestion from a truly impressive student is to retain NRSRO but empower
the SEC to issue nonbinding "writ[s] of review" to call on the CROs to revise any rating
thought to have become inaccurate. See Francis A. Bottini, Jr., Comment, An Examination
of the Current Status of Rating Agencies and Proposals for Limited Oversight of Such
Agencies, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 579, 613 (1993).
12. Careful study of the CROs began as early as 1938. See GILBERT HAROLD, BOND
RATINGS AS AN INVESTMENT GUIDE: AN APPRAISAL OF THEIR EFFECTIVENESS (1938), for an
example of one such study. Many other studies have been conducted by lawyers and other
market watchers and will be considered infra. Economists have studied the CROs'
performance as an empirical matter since the late 1950s. See infra note 101 and
accompanying text.
13. A foundational paper on the subject attempted to put some institutional flesh on the
bones of the efficient capital market hypothesis. See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier
H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549 (1984). As Gilson
and Kraakman observed, it is one thing to assert and empirically prove that markets price
efficiently, but another to explain how they manage it. See id. at 550-53 (explaining that,
while the efficient capital market hypothesis was widely accepted, there was an absence of a
unified explanation of market efficiency at that time). Since then, voluminous literature in
economics and law has studied the question both theoretically and empirically.
14. See, e.g., JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE (2006); Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street: A Voucher
Financing Proposal for Securities Intermediaries, 113 YALE L.J. 269 (2003); Jill E. Fisch &
Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent: Rethinking the Regulation of Analysts, 88
IOWA L. REV. 1035 (2003) (challenging the notion of securities analysts as independent
gatekeepers while evaluating analysts' behavior and impact on market efficiency); Frank
Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?: A Proposalfor a Modified Strict Liability Regime,
79 WASH. U. L.Q. 491 (2001).
15. See Posting of Joellen Perry to Real Time Economics,
http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2007/09/23/greenspan-slams-ratings-agencies (Sept. 23,
2007, 12:59 EST) (recounting media interviews with former Chairman Greenspan, in which
he urged against regulation of CROs: "[CROs are] 'already regulated,' he says, because
investors' loss of trust means the agencies are likely to lose business. 'There's no point
regulating this. The horse is out of the barn, as we like to say."'); Schwarcz, supra note 10,
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The situation is not good. The debate has been, and should be,
dominated by two policy concerns: whether private credit ratings improve
capital-asset pricing efficiency, and whether they reduce systemic risk. At
the moment, neither current events nor the extensive empirical literature on
the CROs gives much reason for optimism as to either question. To
whatever extent it may seem that private entities ordinarily need to not
defend themselves on these grounds, the CROs must because they currently
act as our main substitute for official supervision of significant aspects of
financial markets.
However, the purpose of this Article is not to argue, as others have done
and will do in the future, that the CROs have lacked oversight for too long
or that their behavior has been suboptimal. This Article also does not urge
any particular policy tweak to solve the industry's problems, although it is
clear that a necessary (but not sufficient) step is removing regulatory
reliance on the CROs. The Article will instead assert two more-general
propositions. First, the industry in its current posture cannot be
meaningfully regulated, despite the near-universal agreement that if it is to
persist in its current quasi-governmental role, it must be regulated. Second,
the industry's performance is likely to remain seriously disappointing under
any conceivable change in policy or in an industry structure that still
contemplates a major private role in formal assessment of credit risk. This
will be shown in several ways. This Article will suggest reasons not to be
too sanguine about any of the short-term regulatory solutions available at
the moment, including legal and voluntary constraints currently in place
and those that are currently pending before policymakers. The regulatory
efforts that have recently been brought to bear on CROs are mainly
structural tweaks and disclosure requirements meant to curtail conflicts of
interest and increase CRO competition, which will not work. Controls
were already in place to control conflicts and provide disclosure prior to the
current economic catastrophe, and they have been shown to have been of
no use. Likewise, while increased competition conceivably could improve
the price competitiveness of ratings services, we will argue that it is
unlikely to improve their quality. Indeed, all proposals so far suggested by
academics and others, as well as a few developed in this Article, are fairly
at 15 (arguing that regulation of CROs is unnecessary because "the lack of official public
scrutiny does not appear to affect ratings accuracy because of the de facto accountability of
rating agencies through reputation"); see also Hill, supra note 10, at 44-45 (arguing that the
need to protect "regulatory capital," the threat of potential competition, and the threat of
potential regulation are all sufficient to ensure adequate CRO performance, and urging
against new regulatory oversight); id. at 44 ("While the regime could be improved, it is
certainly not in dire need of repair. Rating agencies certainly didn't do a spectacular job
with Enron, but there is considerable evidence that in the normal course, they do a good, if
not stellar, job.").
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problematic, especially those that countenance some important continuing
regulatory role for private, profit-making risk raters.
Ultimately, the CROs cannot be considered in isolation from the more
fundamental problems of market intermediation, especially as it relates to
financial innovation. On some level, debate about the CROs and how they
should be regulated-and for that matter, debate about any informational
intermediary-is somewhat superficial. The inherent problem of
informational intermediation is basically one of industrial organization,
and, as will be explained at length, it seems very thorny. No policy tool
currently in force, and none of those with serious political feasibility, even
comes close to dealing with it, and those more abstract proposals that might
are both fairly politically implausible and raise serious problems of cost
and uncertainty. The problem is not the CROs themselves nor the details
of any regulatory policy set up to constrain their abuses, but rather the
problem is a combination of factors inherent in the market for privately
organized production of financial market information. Critically, we will
stress that informational problems in financial markets would not simply
resolve themselves if the government stopped relying on CRO ratings in its
regulation of those markets. In short, the purpose of this Article is to argue
that capital markets currently contain a much more serious institutional
flaw than has been recognized.
I. THE RISE OF THE CROs
A. How the CROs Came to Be
Careful histories of the CROs exist, so this Article sets out only relevant
background. 16 Coming up with credit ratings17 is an old business, finding
16. Among the best histories of the agencies are Frank Partnoy's influential article, The
Siskel and Ebert of Fiancial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies,
77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 636-54 (1999), and Richard Sylla, An Historical Primer on the
Business of Credit Rating, in RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL
SYSTEM 19 (Richard M. Levich et al. eds., 2002), and, as to the industry's early history, a
book on which other histories rely heavily, HAROLD, supra note 12. Also very good are
COFFEE, supra note 14, at 283-314, SINCLAIR, supra note 5, at 22-49, and Richard Cantor &
Frank Packer, The Credit Rating Industry, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. Q. REv., Summer-Fall
1994, at 1.
17. A "credit rating" is an assessment of the likelihood that the issuer of a fixed income
security will meet its obligations according to the terms of the security and in a timely
manner. See Standard & Poor's, About Credit Ratings,
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/aboutcreditratings (last visited June 14, 2009). CROs
do not typically rate equity securities. The CROs predominantly rate (1) the general
creditworthiness of particular issuers, and (2) publicly traded debt securities, preferred
shares, and privately placed securities issued by structured finance issuers.
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antecedents in the United States in the mid-nineteenth century. 18 It has
remained a predominantly American phenomenon, not only because of the
American ratings firms' size and competitive advantages, but because until
recently, U.S. capital markets were quite different than those overseas.19 In
any case, the two dominant U.S. CROs, Moody's Investors Services
(Moody's) 2 0 and Standard & Poor's Ratings Services (S&P), 21 currently
face meaningful competition only from a third and much smaller U.S.-
based firm, Fitch Ratings (Fitch). 22 The number of large, general-purpose
18. "Mercantile" credit rating agencies reported on merchant creditworthiness as early
as the 1840s. Several of them later combined to form what is now Dun & Bradstreet. Other
forms of widely disseminated, financial-data publications began at about the same time. See
Partnoy, supra note 11, at 636-37. But, as Sinclair observes, the CROs began to take their
modem form only in 1909, when John Moody first began issuing ratings that actually made
judgments about creditworthiness. Sinclair says the transition to this process of informed
appraisal was a response to the financial panic of 1907. Overall, Sinclair describes this
period-from the mid-nineteenth century to about World War I-as an "information
explosion" in American finance. See SINCLAIR, supra note 5, at 23-24. Moody claimed to
have taken his model from a predecessor in Austria, but no trace of it has been found. Id. at
24 n. 11. Thus, the business of systematic risk assessment of debt securities appears to have
an American origin.
19. In fact, for the most part, borrowing from capital markets rather than banks was
itself essentially an American practice until the 1960s. Though government-issuer bond
markets have existed since the early seventeenth century, corporate bond markets only
emerged around 1850 in the United States, with the need to finance the expanding railroads.
See Sylla, supra note 16, at 22-24. White speculates that the dominance of bank lending in
most other places may reflect their smaller geographic size, allowing for better borrower
oversight through branching. See White, supra note 5, at 58 n.2 1.
20. Moody's currently exists as a publicly traded holding company, Moody's
Corporation, which provides credit rating services through its subsidiary Moody's Investors
Service. A separate subsidiary, Moody's Analytics, sells various nonratings services. John
Moody was not the first to publish reports on corporate creditworthiness, nor was he even
the first to systematize bond ratings into simple symbols, but he was the first to establish it
as a going business. Interestingly, he also aspired to muckraking journalism and public
service generally, and wrote a treatise on abuse and power on Wall Street that is still read
today. See SINCLAIR, supra note 5, at 6 (discussing John Moody, The Masters of Capital: A
Chronicle of Wall Street, in 22 GREAT LEADERS IN BUSINESS AND POLITICS: THE CHRONICLES
OF AMERICA SERIES 1 (Allen Johnson ed., 1919)); SINCLAIR, supra note 5, at 23-24 (laying
out early history of the Moody's enterprise). John Moody's original business was acquired
by Dun & Bradstreet in 1962 and was spun off in late 2000. It has remained a freestanding
publicly traded corporation ever since. See Moody's Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at
1-2 (Feb. 29, 2008), http://sec.edgar-online.com/moodys-corp-de/10-k-annual-
report/2008/02/29/Section 1 .aspx [hereinafter 2007 Annual Report Form 10-K].
21. S&P arose from the 1941 merger of the Standard Statistics Bureau and Poor's
Publishing, but both companies had been in the business of securities analysis long before
that. Poor's published financial data since Henry Vamum Poor's 1860 publication of
History of Railroads and Canals in the United States. S&P's debt-rating business began in
1916 when Standard began publishing them. S&P has been a subsidiary of the McGraw-
Hill publishing enterprise since 1966. See Standard & Poor's, Company History,
http://www2.standardandpoors.com (follow "Company History" hyperlink in "About S&P"
drop-down menu) (last visited July 28, 2009).
22. Since 1997 Fitch has been wholly owned by a French holding company, Fimilac,
S.A. Until 2006, Fimilac had been diversified in a range of manufacturing businesses but
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ratings firms has mainly fluctuated between three and five throughout the
industry's entire history,2 3 though many smaller CROs exist around the
world.24
The history of the CROs cannot be understood apart from their relation
to various governments. Since 1936 the U.S. government has imposed
requirements on financial institutions and investment managers that
prospectively incorporated CRO ratings into investment rules. Similar
state requirements quickly followed.25 While this regulatory partnership
plainly aided the CROs financially, the number and effect of the regulatory
incorporations blossomed in the early 1970s with the Securities and
Exchange Commission's (SEC's) decision to make special regulatory use
of ratings in setting capital requirements for securities firms. Thus arose
the SEC's now-familiar "Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organization" (NRSRO) designation.26 Since then scores of federal and
has now divested all but Fitch and a related firm, the Toronto-based risk-management outfit
Algorithmics. The History of Fitch Ratings,
http://www.fitchratings.com/jsp/corporate/AboutFitch.faces?context=1 &detail=3 (last
visited July 28, 2009) (providing a brief history of the foundation and reorganization of
Fitch). Fitch's predecessor was founded as an independent publishing firm in New York in
1913 and issued its first bond ratings in 1924. See Partnoy, supra note 11, at 639 (recalling
Fitch's entry into the bond rating market)
23. See White, supra note 10, at 1-2 (discussing the historical dominance of a select
group of rating firms). At times some other nontrivial competitors have flourished, and
there remain a few firms with significant roles in niche ratings specialties. Id. at 2.
Specifically, A.M. Best Company persists as a rater of insurance companies and was given
limited NRSRO designation in 2005 to rate their likelihood of paying claims. See A.M.
Best Co., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2005 WL 678,901 (Mar. 3, 2005), available at
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mr-noaction/am030305.htm. (granting tentative,
limited authority). Prior to their acquisition by Fitch in 2000, the English firm IBCA and
the Canadian firm Thomson BankWatch had enjoyed a long history as raters of banks and
financial institutions. See The History of Fitch Ratings,
http://www.fitchratings.com!jsp/corporate/AboutFitch.faces?context=1 &detail=3 (last
visited July 28, 2009) (commenting on the postmerger proliferation of Fitch Ratings).
24. As of September 1999, the Bank for International Settlements identified as many as
130 CROs worldwide. See Arturo Estrella et al., Credit Ratings and Complementary
Sources of Credit Quality Information 14 (Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Working
Paper No. 3, 2000), available at http://www.bis.org/publlbcbs-wp3.pdf (conservatively
estimating the total number of rating agencies, but indicating that that number could be as
high as 150).
25. Beginning in 1931 with an explicit capital requirement for federal banks imposed
by the Comptroller of the Currency, the federal government began "incorporating credit
ratings into substantive regulations." See Partnoy, supra note 10, at 70 (arguing that
implementation of credit ratings as a means for determining the caliber of bank holdings
created a high-demand market for ratings agencies).
Since the mid-twentieth century state regulators of banking and insurance have used
bond ratings in capital adequacy regulation. See THOMAS R. ATKINSON, TRENDS IN
CORPORATE BOND QUALITY 52-53 (1967) (noting the 1949 adoption by National
Association of Supervisors of State Banks and the 1951 adoption by National Association of
Insurance Commissioners).
26. This designation has been one significant barrier preventing competitive entry into
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state laws have come to incorporate NRSRO ratings,2 7 and CROs have also
been given other regulatory advantages.28 Similar use of ratings has been
made by courts, 29 investment-fund designers, 30 other private parties, 3' and
32
increasingly by foreign governments.
The history likewise cannot be understood without some attention to the
revolution that appears to have surrounded an unexpected liquidity crisis in
the CRO market (and we will make the case that there have been others). In 1973, the SEC
adopted a rule requiring that certain regulated securities firms' minimum capital reserves be
calculated by using different "haircuts" for securities with specific NRSRO ratings. See
SEC, supra note 3, at 6. As White observes, U.S. regulators had long incorporated ratings
in various ways, but prior to 1975, regulators generally referred only to "recognized ratings
manuals." It was only in the SEC's regulation of 1975 that specific firms were identified
whose ratings must be used. See White, supra note 10, at 3-6 (inferring that the pre-1975
language was nonetheless "probably understood to mean Moody's, S&P, and Fitch"). The
SEC's move may have reflected the CROs' then-recent switch to the "issuer-pays" business
model. But see id. at 3-4 (offering an opposing rationale for the switch). Given that model,
the use of ratings in regulation would create a greater risk of unscrupulous raters selling
investment-grade ratings to any issuer willing to pay. See id. at 6-7 (noting that because the
new SEC rule essentially guaranteed demand for ratings, the newly designated NRSRO had
little motivation to improve the quality of their product). See generally Partnoy, supra note
11, at 690-91 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (1998) (discussing the promulgation of SEC
Rule 15c3-1 and the "cascade of regulation" that followed)).
27. As of 2002, the NRSRO concept was explicitly incorporated in eight federal
statutes and sixty federal regulations, mostly in banking and securities regulation. See
Partnoy, supra note 11, at 74-75. Partnoy also notes that, if anything, CROs enjoy even
more influence through the informal use that state and federal regulators make of the
NRSRO concept in the many orders, releases, and letters of their day-to-day business. Id. at
75.
28. Notably, the CROs are explicitly exempted from the Regulation Fair Disclosure
(FD) ban on selective disclosure of material nonpublic information, and are sometimes privy
to such information when making their ratings. See Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R.
§ 243.100(b)(2)(iii) (2008) (making disclosure requirements inapplicable "[t]o an entity
whose primary business is the issuance of credit ratings"). While material nonpublic
information could theoretically increase the accuracy of ratings, the CROs claim they can
produce accurate ratings without this special dispensation.
29. Since the early twentieth century, courts considering fiduciary litigation against
trustees and other investment managers found investment in highly rated instruments to
weigh in favor of the fiduciary. See Partnoy, supra note 11, at 640-41 (providing a brief
survey of cases from the 1920s and 1930s that utilized ratings to determine liability).
30. Since at least the early 1930s, many trusts and other institutional investors have
explicitly limited their managers' investments by reference to CROs' ratings. See id. at 644
(discussing early use of ratings to craft principles).
31. Explicit references to CROs' ratings, often using the NRSRO designation, have
been included in an unknown but unquestionably massive number of private contracts and
financial instruments. Typically those terms provide that in the event of an NRSRO
downgrade of a party to the transaction or some instrument that underlies it, certain
consequences follow, such as constructive default or accelerated repayment. See Partnoy,
supra note 11, at 676-81 (explaining the operation of CRO ratings in the credit derivatives
market).
32. The CROs enjoy some overseas regulatory benefits with the incorporation of U.S.
NRSRO ratings in the laws of other countries, and with the gradual implementation of the
Basel II External Credit Assessment Institution initiative. See supra note 5 (summarizing
the impact of foreign regulations on CROs).
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1970,"3 prior to which U.S. corporate debt markets had performed well.
34
The calamity of 1970 happened to roughly coincide with certain worldwide
monetary changes.35 The major consequence for the CROs would turn out
to be a very profitable change in their business model. Apparently to take
advantage of a substantial increase in demand for analytical risk
intermediation, the major CROs each, within the space of a few years,
switched from selling subscriptions to the so-called issuer-pays model:
when one of the major CROs rates an issuer or its debt securities, the issuer
almost always pays for the rating that is issued.3 6
By all accounts, the worldwide CRO industry is a massive duopoly,37
and given the so-called two-ratings norm-most issuers seek the ratings of
both Moody's and S&P, even though they are not required to do so---38
33. In a well-known story, the Penn Central Railroad unexpectedly defaulted on $82
million in commercial paper in 1970, which was followed by other short-term defaults and a
general short-term liquidity crisis. See White, supra note 5, at 47 (characterizing the
defaults as "a defining moment that has focused both issuers and investors on the risks of
such issuances").
34. In what remains the most comprehensive study of U.S. corporate bond
performance, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) economist Braddock
Hickman found that during the first half of the twentieth century investors in U.S. bonds
enjoyed a net loss rate of almost exactly zero-a result Hickman called "a tribute to the
ability of domestic business corporations to service their long-term obligations .... " W.
BRADDOCK HICKMAN, CORPORATE BOND QUALITY AND INVESTOR EXPERIENCE 7-8 (1958)
[hereinafter HICKMAN, INVESTOR EXPERIENCE]. By "zero net loss," Hickman meant that the
overall capital gains earned by increasing bond prices in secondary trading almost exactly
set off losses from defaults. Id. Sylla expresses some doubts as to Hickman's optimism.
As he observes, on the basis of his own work, U.S. interest rates began at an already low
rate in 1900 and gradually declined throughout the period of Hickman's data to near all-time
lows around the end of World War 1I. He says that this "trend may account for a good part
of the capital gains on bonds that offset losses from defaults." Sylla, supra note 16, at 26.
Hickman's work appeared in three separate volumes. W. BRADDOCK HICKMAN,
STATISTICAL MEASURES OF CORPORATE BOND FINANCING SINCE 1900 (1960); W. BRADDOCK
HICKMAN, CORPORATE BOND QUALITY AND INVESTOR EXPERIENCE (1958); W. BRADDOCK
HICKMAN, THE VOLUME OF CORPORATE BOND FINANCING SINCE 1900 (1953).
35. As will be discussed, the late 1960s and early 1970s saw a significant increase in
exchange and interest-rate volatility associated with the breakdown of the Bretton Woods
monetary system. Certain new trends arose in innovative, experimental financial products
that were meant to help firms smooth their risks in part to address that new volatility. See
infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text (discussing the development of the novel
practices).
36. White argues, by contrast, that this transition merely reflected the rise of low-cost
photocopying, which posed a free-rider problem for the rating firms, which they attempted
to avert by switching to the issuer-pays model. See White, supra note 10, at 3-4.
37. As of 2006, Moody's and S&P had 80% of the market as measured by revenue, but
they rated as much as 99% of publicly traded debt issues and preferred stock in the United
States. See S. REP. No. 109-326, at 4 (2006), reprinted in 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. 865. In fact,
an early version of CRARA was titled the "Credit Rating Agency Duopoly Relief Act of
2005." H.R. 2990, 109th Cong. (2005).
38. Issuers obtain both ratings in part because some of the regulatory and private-
contract provisions requiring investment in rated securities require that an issue receive a
minimum rating from two NRSROs. However, even though most regulatory rating
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some observers characterize them as a "partner monopoly., 39 They also
retain unrivaled dominance overseas.4 ° While several new foreign agencies
have risen, they frequently have operating partnership arrangements with
the U.S. firms or are owned by them. Such independent agencies mostly
remain small, and in some cases there is reason to doubt their independence
and veracity. Again, as it does here in the United States, Fitch holds a
fairly distant third-place position overseas. The dominance of the major
CROs likely has more than one cause. It is frequently explained by the
NRSRO designation and the need of most institutional investors for
NRSRO-rated securities. But it seems likely that even if NRSRO rules
were to be repealed, entry now would be severely impeded by the need to
establish reputation as a seasoned CRO. 4' The privilege of duopoly has
been very profitable.42
requirements do not call for more than one rating, the vast majority of issuers voluntarily
acquire ratings from both Moody's and S&P anyway. See Richard Cantor & Frank Packer,
Multiple Ratings and Credit Standards: Differences of Opinion in the Credit Rating
Industry, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. STAFF REP., Apr. 1996, at 3-6, available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff reports/srl2.pdf (explaining the prevalence of
issuers acquiring both Moody's and S&P ratings).
39. One important entity that characterized the situation as a partner monopoly is the
Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice. See Jonathan R. Laing, Failing Grade,
BARRON'S, Dec. 24, 2007, at 19, 20 (alluding to the designation of "partner monopoly" used
by unnamed Justice Department staffers).
40. Moody's and S&P both cover European bond ratings extensively, and have
extensive coverage in Latin America and Asia, although S&P is more dominant in the
former and Moody's is more dominant in the latter. White, supra note 5, at 44-45.
41. Partnoy observes that entry costs appear to have been quite low in the industry's
early years, as the process of analyzing even a large amount of publicly available financial
data should not, in principle, entail extraordinary costs or sunk investment, or pose
regulatory hurdles. See Partnoy, supra note 11, at 636-40 (asserting that low overhead costs
and ease of entry allowed agencies the ability to quickly gain-or lose-"reputational
capital"). Times now seem significantly different.
42. In 2006 Moody's earned $1.1 billion on only $2 billion in revenue, and until
recently, Moody's operating margins ran typically to more than 50% per year. Laing, supra
note 39, at 20. Evidence for prior years is comparable. See White, supra note 5, at 49
(reporting that for the years 1995 to 2000 Moody's average after-tax net income was 42%).
Though S&P's performance results are not as publicly available, it stands to reason that its
performance has been similar. The two firms have long enjoyed comparable market shares
and have near-identical pricing structures. These results are often taken to reflect the
privilege of NRSRO status, as their performance and pricing structure are hard to explain
without some strong assumption of market power associated with regulatory rules. As
White observes, Moody's and S&P impose almost identical, flat-fee structures that are
keyed to the size of the issues under review. Both firms offer discounts for repeat business,
though the details of those discounts have not been made public. See id. at 47-48 (asserting
that although Moody's and S&P automatically rate "all[] SEC-registered corporate bonds,"
an overwhelming majority of issuers pay for the service, allowing the agencies to set lower
fees). He argues at length that their fee structure is best explained as the result of a
substantial amount of market power, unconstrained by even potential entry.
White points out a certain mystery surrounding the CROs' pricing and coverage
behavior. Given the apparently rigid two-ratings norm, each major may have fairly little to
fear from unilateral price increases. See supra notes 37-38, 41 and accompanying text
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There is reason to expect that Moody's and S&P could still command
substantial market share even without the NRSRO designation because of
the two-ratings norm, and because of the periods prior to the dominance of
NRSRO in which ratings from the majors severely constrained access to
debt markets.43 These facts are theoretically somewhat difficult to explain.
Many have claimed that some part of the explanation is due to the
substantive value issuers find in ratings, 4 though that in itself seems
unlikely to explain their massive, sustained profits.
The CROs earn their revenues overwhelmingly from issuer-pays ratings
fees. 45  CRO reform proposals sometimes suggest abolishing the issuer-
pays model and frequently call for repeal of the NRSRO concept, which
might drastically reduce demand for issuer-paid ratings. The CROs
probably could not persist at their current scale of operations without the
issuer-pays model, and may not survive its loss. Securities research is
difficult to support on subscription fees alone, which is shown by the
decline in the equity-securities analysis field since its major scandal a few
years ago,46 by the financial difficulties suffered by the CROs themselves
(discussing the causes and likely continuation of Moody's and S&P dominance). On these
facts they ought to be able jointly to raise profits by reducing output. White considers this a
"puzzle to which we can only supply some partially satisfactory answers." See White, supra
note 5, at 48 (addressing, but ultimately not adopting, four possible explanations for the
status quo of the firms' pricing parity).
43. A credit crunch in 1974 and 1975 foreclosed many issuers from bond markets
entirely if they could not secure high investment-grade ratings. The crunch seems to have
reflected the liquidity tightening following the Penn Central default in 1970 and the
generally difficult circumstances of the early 1970s. See Marilyn Much, The Rating Game:
When Baa Spells Bah, INDUSTRY WK., Jan. 8, 1979, at 44 (describing the condition of the
credit markets in the 1970s).
44. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 10, at 64-90 (arguing that the two-ratings norm is
perpetuated not by issuers seeking "favorable regulatory treatment," but by the
informational value provided by the ratings of Moody's and S&P).
45. While most CROs sell products other than the ratings they provide (e.g., most
produce various periodicals, sell subscriptions, consulting services, nonratings analytical
software, and the like), the CROs earn almost all of their revenues from ratings fees charged
to the rated issuers. Partnoy, supra note 11, at 652 n.162 and accompanying text.
46. At one time, most major investment banks and brokerages employed in-house
securities analysts, as they found them to be profitable adjuncts to their other businesses.
The analysts were heavily subsidized by those other business units-as was necessarily the
case because their analysis was distributed free to firm clients-but when legal intervention
by the SEC and the New York Attorney General famously forced the banks to disentangle
and isolate their analysts from conflicts of interest, those departments quickly shriveled.
The business of securities analysis is now a shadow of what it was during that period, such
that proposals are now being made to prop it up with subsidies of various kinds. See
COFFEE, supra note 14, at 245-73 (discussing the rise of firm use of in-house analysts and
the likely causes of its decline); Choi & Fisch, supra note 14, at 312 (noting the downturn in
the number of analysts employed by financial firms during the early 2000s); John L. Orcutt,
Investor Skepticism v. Investor Confidence: Why the New Research Analyst Reforms Will
Harm Investors, 81 DENV. U. L. REv. 1, 26-77 (2003) (recounting at length regulatory
intervention in the industry and its drawbacks, and suggesting an SEC "warning label" on
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during the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, before the adoption of issuer-pays,47
and by the fact that only relatively small CROs currently operate on
subscription fees. This is probably because securities research is
expensive, 48 and because on even a semi-strong efficient-markets
assumption, it should be difficult to extract sufficient subscription
revenues.
49
Finally, the CROs have been the focus of unceasing criticism that
seriously calls into question policymakers' reliance upon credit ratings.
There have been two central themes: (1) doubt that ratings add new
information sufficient to justify their cost, and (2) alarm over their failure
to predict financial distress involving companies that they rate. We will
explore the former in detail later, 50 though it is worth noting that as far back
as 1938, observers questioned the value of ratings. 51  As to the latter,
catastrophic failures of CRO predictions go back thirty years or so and
include several types of debt, beginning with the failure to predict the
massive bond defaults by New York City in 1975 and the default by the
Washington Public Power Supply System in 1983.52 They also failed to
predict several massive derivatives-related losses, which literally spanned
the 1990s, 53 the Asian currency crisis that followed a few years later,54 and
securities analysis as an alternative).
47. See Partnoy, supra note 11, at 646-47 (recounting the effect of a relatively stable
bond market on the demand for ratings); Richard House, Ratings Trouble, INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR, Oct. 1995, at 245 (commenting that the adoption of issuer-pays has caused a
"major schism in the industry").
48. See Orcutt, supra note 46, at 16 & nn.70-71 (citing Kent L. Womack, Do
Brokerage Analysts'Recommendations Have Investment Value?, 51 J. FIN. 137, 138 (1996))
(noting the substantial costs to investment banks).
49. Assuming, as the semi-strong position does, that securities prices reflect all
publicly available information, then as soon as a CRO distributes analysis to a few
subscribers, the information should be reflected in bond and stock markets. See Eugene F.
Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383,
404-09 (1970) (evaluating studies on stock splits and earnings reports to explain the semi-
strong form theory underlying the efficient-markets hypothesis and ultimately concluding
that the theory has the highest potential for future empirical use). Therefore most investors
will not have much incentive to pay CRO subscription fees-any gains to be made on the
basis of CRO recommendations should be captured too quickly for most investors to exploit.
50. See infra Part III (addressing the missing theoretical basis for both CROs and the
potential for added value in ratings).
51. See generally HAROLD, supra note 12 (examining the already widespread and vital
role bond ratings played in investment decisionmaking during the early twentieth century).
52. See Bottini, supra note 11, at 584-87 (summarizing the criticisms of Moody's and
S&P's perceived slow responses to the numerous red flags preceding the two major bond
defaults).
53. The highest profile losses of this period were (1) Gibson Greetings, Inc.'s $16.7
million loss and Proctor & Gamble's $157 million loss, both involving complex interest-rate
derivatives traded with Bankers Trust; (2) the $2.5 billion loss suffered by Orange County,
California on several complex derivatives arrangements with Merrill Lynch and other
banks; and (3) the $1.5 billion loss suffered by Barings Bank as a result of the trading
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the corporate collapses of the early twenty-first century. 55 Their role in the
current credit crisis is better characterized as active complicity, as they
helped create the market for subprime residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) and related derivative products.56 This did not stop until
these markets collapsed all at once, on the day when Moody's and S&P
simultaneously downgraded large numbers of subprime structured bonds,
the day now known as "Pearl Harbor Day. 57
B. How They Do What They Do
The standard rating process has been recounted extensively elsewhere,
58
activity of a twenty-seven-year-old trader named Nick Leeson. See generally FRANK
PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: How DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED THE FINANCIAL MARKETS
49-53, 112-115 (2003) (providing an in-depth explanation of Gibson Greetings' losses);
SINCLAIR, supra note 5, at 157-60 (recalling the failed investment portfolio of Orange
County Treasurer Robert L. Citron and the unsuccessful lawsuit the County brought against
S&P); Lynn A. Stout, Betting the Bank: How Derivatives Trading Under Conditions of
Uncertainty Can Increase Risks and Erode Returns in Financial Markets, 21 J. CORP. L. 53,
53-54 (1995) (discussing the substantial losses sustained by Proctor & Gamble and
Barings).
54. This crisis has been attributed in large part to derivative instruments that attempted
arbitrage against the currency of Thailand, which for some years had been arbitrarily
maintained by that country's central bank. See SINCLAIR, supra note 5, at 160-67 (detailing
the two stages of the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the wave of criticism directed at the
major rating agencies).
55. See id. at 167-72 (discussing the 2001 Enron bankruptcy, ensuing legislation, and
inquiries into additional SEC oversight of NRSROs).
56. Structured securities are deliberately designed so that some portion of the securities
issued by any structured entity will enjoy the highest or a very high investment-grade rating.
This fact drove the intense demand of institutional investors for structured securities with
the riskiest underlying collateral because top-tranche bonds pay regularly and typically at a
rate higher than other similarly rated bonds. Further, they satisfy the requirement of many
institutional investors to purchase mainly investment-grade instruments. CROs helped
securitizers to prearrange securitizations by selling consulting services to ensure highest
possible ratings for top-tranche securities, and even helped repackage parts of the lowest
rated tranches into new securitizations, turning a significant portion of them into highly
rated derivatives. See generally Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and Its Discontents:
The Dynamics of Financial Product Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553 (2008)
(critiquing the legal bases of securitization and providing a comprehensive study of its
prevalence). Structured finance ratings were by far the CROs most profitable business for
many years. See infra note 108 (noting the 2002-2006 revenue). They were also the most
plagued with conflicts of interest, and they bore a frightening resemblance to those in the
accounting industry prior to its collapse, when firms like Arthur Andersen were selling
management consulting services to firms they audited.
57. On that day, July 10, 2007, Moody's and S&P simultaneously announced credit
downgrades as to $20 billion worth of subprime mortgage-backed bonds. See Laing, supra,
note 39, at 19 (describing the onset of a series of downgrades). No less than a month later,
SEC staff launched a formal investigation pursuant to statutory authority, and it is perhaps a
sign of changing times that the three major CROs complied so fully in the investigation,
producing millions of pages of internal documents, communications, and e-mails. See
generally SEC 2008 STAFF REPORT, supra note 3.
58. See, e.g., YARON ERNST, MOODY'S INVESTORS SERV., THE COMBINED USE OF
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and an outline of the process has been disclosed by the CROs in publicly
accessible documents.59 In the broadest terms, it resembles the judgments
lenders ordinarily make about the creditworthiness of their counterparties,
60
though in many cases CRO procedures contain internal controls and appeal
opportunities for issuers. 61 Accordingly, if the CROs really do possess
some genuine comparative advantage, it is likely not in the substance of
their rating methodologies. Theoretical approaches to credit risk
assessment are extensively studied by academics and other professionals,62
and a substantial body of empirical evidence shows that credit ratings can
largely be predicted on the basis of simple financial ratios generated from
QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS AND STATISTICAL MODELS IN THE RATING OF SECURITISATIONS 6-8
(2001), available at http://www.moodys.com/moodys/cust/research/
MDCdocs/20/2001200000348392.pdf (providing an overview of the qualitative and
quantitative analyses employed by Moody's); BIS STRUCTURED FINANCE REPORT, supra
note 5, at 14-16 (contrasting components of the rating process for bonds with that of
structured finance products); SEC 2008 STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 7-10; Partnoy, supra
note 11, at 651-52; Hearing on Credit Rating Agencies Before the H. Comm. on Oversight
and Government Reform, 110th Cong. 5-8 (2008) (testimony of Raymond W. McDaniel,
Chairman & Chief Executive Officer, Moody's Corporation) [hereinafter McDaniel
Testimony] (outlining Moody's credit rating process).
59. See, e.g., MOODY'S INVESTORS SERV., UNDERSTANDING MOODY'S CORPORATE
BOND RATINGS AND RATING PROCESS (2002), available at
http://v2.moodys.com/moodys/cust/research/MDCdocs/06/2001400000389218.pdf, JAY
SIEGEL, MOODY'S INVESTORS SERV., MOODY'S MORTGAGE METRICS: A MODEL ANALYSIS OF
RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE POOLS (2003), available at
http://v2.moodys.com/cust/content/Content.ashx?source=StaticContent/Free%2Pages/Prod
ucts%20and%2OServices/Downloadable%2OFiles/m3%20special%20report.pdf; STANDARD
& POOR'S FIN. SERVS., GUIDE TO CREDIT RATING ESSENTIALS (2009), available at
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/fixedincome/SPCreditRatingsGuide.pdf.
The precise process each CRO uses is proprietary and its details are typically kept
secret. See SINCLAIR, supra note 5, at 33-34 (stating that not only are the criteria important
to the CRO, but also that publishing criteria would distort expectation among issuers);
Partnoy, supra note 10, at 73 (noting the unexpected nature of the CROs' secretive and
qualitative process).
60. See Partnoy, supra note 11, at 651 (noting that "the process agencies use today to
generate ratings does not provide any obvious advantages over those used by competing
information providers and analysts").
61. Initially, a lead analyst assigned to the given issue or issuer undertakes both a
quantitative and qualitative analysis of the default risk posed, including, as a major
component, quantitative credit-risk modeling. The analyst then presents a proposed rating
for a vote to a "ratings committee," which is composed of other analytical staff. After the
committee has decided on a rating, the issuer can review it before the rating is published. If
the issuer feels the rating is based on incorrect information, the issuer may disagree with the
rating and appeal to the committee to change it. This appeal will not necessarily be granted.
Some CROs allow issuers to veto the release of the rating. See Who Rates the Raters?,
ECONOMIST, Mar. 26, 2005, at 68. Once a final rating has been settled on, it is published
and subsequently monitored. See generally McDaniel Testimony, supra note 58, at 5-8;
SEC 2008 STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 9.
62. See Til Schuermann, A Review of Recent Books on Credit Risk, 20 J. APPLIED
ECONOMETRICS 123 (2005) (surveying literature discussing the diverse set of issues
surrounding credit risk).
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publicly available data.63 In any case, ratings fees are typically negotiated
up front and include break-up fees should the issuer ultimately choose not
to have the rating issued by that particular CRO.64
The process for rating structured products, such as mortgage-backed
securities (MBSs), is somewhat more involved, and has posed special
problems. 65 Issuers approach CROs with pools of asset-backed securities
(ABSs) to be rated, typically having prestructured them using software that
the CROs themselves create and sell to ensure a desired rating for the
highest tranches in the pool. 66 The arranger then indicates its desired target
rating and discusses with the CRO how the pool's structure may be
adjusted to achieve that rating.67 Quantitative factors considered include
the degree of credit enhancements in the pool 68 and the historical
performance of similar assets created by the originators. 69 The qualitative
63. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
64. BIS STRUCTURED FINANCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 14; SEC 2008 STAFF REPORT,
supra note 3, at 9 (stating that rating agencies may not receive payment if no rating is
eventually published).
65. Rating other structured products, such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), is
similar. When CDOs are rated the only assets investigated are the MBS and not their
underlying asset pools. Because CDOs are actively managed, their composition changes
over time. Thus, CDO ratings are not based on pool composition, but rather on the
covenanted limits for each asset the CDO can hold. SEC 2008 STAFF REPORT, supra note 3,
at 9. One of the puzzling aspects of CDO ratings is how analysts believed they could
provide accurate ratings without investigating the assets underlying the ABS in the CDO.
Indeed, some smaller CROs refused to rate CDOs because their composition made little
sense.
66. See McDaniel Testimony, supra note 58, at 12 (explaining Moody's role in the
mortgage securitization process); SEC 2008 STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 8 (examining
the steps analysts take when rating securitized mortgages).
Thus, for example, if the preliminary rating is based on the pool's structure, the
arranger may restructure the pool to ensure the highest possible rating. The majority of
adjustments that have to be made to the pool to achieve an investment-grade rating,
however, take place in the initial back-and-forth between the CRO and the issuer or via use
of CRO software. BIS STRUCTURED FINANCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 26.
67. BIS STRUCTURED FINANCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 26. Importantly, the conflicts
of interest that arise when a CRO sells advice on structuring a product to improve its rating
and then rates that same product are almost identical to the conflicts of interest that plagued
accounting firms at the turn of the century. In fact, the conflicts inherent in accounting
firms selling management consulting services to a corporation and then auditing that same
corporation are often cited as a root cause of the failure of the largest accounting firms and
their largest clients. The primary difference between the two is that the CROs have not
failed due to their behavior, even though their structured finance ratings did.
68. Credit enhancements may take a number of forms. For example, they could
include an originator guaranteeing portions of losses in certain tranches or insurance
companies insuring against some losses.
69. McDaniel Testimony, supra note 58, at 6. One wonders how this was possible with
some new and innovative assets, such as pay-option adjustable-rate mortgages,
securitizations of which grew from $1.8 billion in 2002 to $154 billion in 2005. AMITA
SHRIVASTAVA & TODD SWANSON, MOODY'S INVESTORS SERV., RATING U.S. OPTION ARM
RMBS-MOODY'S UPDATED RATING APPROACH 2, fig. 1 (2007), available at
http://www.moodys.com/moodys/cust/research/MDCdocs/04/2006800000450911 .pdf.
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factors considered also differ in the structured context and have caused
concern.
70
II. THE ENTANGLED GROWTH OF INNOVATION, DISINTERMEDIATION,
AND DEREGULATION
The fate of the CROs, in some part by their own doing, has been bound
up with two significant developments in recent history: (1) the evolution of
new financial products, a process commonly called financial innovation,
and (2) the process of disintermediation, which is the gradual transition
from indirect investment through bank deposits to direct investment in
securities, with a resulting erosion of the buffer that once existed between
investors and borrowers. Innovation and disintermediation have been
central to the CROs' very profitable business model of the past few
decades because as products grow both more opaque and increasingly
The main quantitative inputs into each agency's ratings methodology are the
probability of default of individual obligors in the pool, recovery rates or losses given
default, and default correlations within the pool. Default correlations deal with systematic
risk and reflect the sensitivity of probabilities of default to common factors. Modeling
default correlations is an analytical challenge for most CROs. BIS STRUCTURED FINANCE
REPORT, supra note 5, at 17, 30. With regard to the default correlations among MBSs, the
high rates of home-loan refinance instead of default from the late 1990s through 2006 may
have hidden the default correlation of mortgage loans.
70. Theoretically, the CROs considered three primary qualitative factors: (1) the
"bankruptcy remoteness" of the entity holding the assets from the firm that originally
contributed them to the holder; (2) the quality of the management of the issuer and the
services provided by the entity that services the loan (including factors such as the
origination process and the comprehensiveness of loan underwriting); and (3) the integrity
of the legal structure of the underlying assets. McDaniel Testimony, supra note 58, at 6.
See ERNST, supra note 58, at 6 (discussing the benefits of qualitative analysis in obtaining
accurate results); BIS STRUCTURED FINANCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 16-21 (discussing
structured finance rating methodology).
There is reason to doubt that these qualitative considerations were seriously
undertaken. The CROs' analysis of bankruptcy remoteness has been severely criticized.
See generally Kettering, supra note 56, at 1671-1710 (criticizing CROs for their "too big to
fail" mentality). Likewise, for legal judgments about the underlying assets the CROs have
acknowledged that they relied on the arrangers' own "representations and warranties,"
despite their own recognition that those representations were suspect. See McDaniel
Testimony, supra note 58, at 13; see also MARJAN RIGGI, MOODY'S INVESTORS SERV., THE
IMPORTANCE OF REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES IN RMBS TRANSACTIONS 1 (2005),
available at http://www.moodys.com/moodys/cust/research/
MDCdocs/14/2003000000447014.pdf (stating that representations and warranties only
provide a "small but important" loss protection). This happened despite groups within
CROs that could have taken on this task (for example, the corporate finance group at
Moody's qualitatively analyzes, among other things, business strategy and management
quality) and had loan-level information on factors such as the level of documented borrower
income, and the CROs could have required issuers to provide audits of the underlying
assets. See KRUTI MUNI & DEEPIKA KOTHARI, MOODY'S INVESTOR SERV., MOODY'S
APPROACH TO CODING SUBPRIME RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE DOCUMENTATION PROGRAMS:
UPDATED METHODOLOGY 1 (2006), available at
http://www.moodys.com/moodys/cust/research/MDCdocs/28/2006200000425098.pdf.
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available to investors that lack strong, in-house analytic capabilities,
regulators and investors rely more and more on the advice of analytical
intermediaries. 71 These two developments in turn have taken place against
the background of another possibly epochal trend, the deregulation of the
U.S. and international financial sectors and the voluntary migration of
private assets to less-regulated sectors of the economy.72  Not
coincidentally, these are all implicated in the present financial crisis,7 3 and
for that reason most observers place the three major CROs at or near its
center.
First, it seems acknowledged that a wave of creative new financial
products began not all that long ago, and that it continues.74 It is ordinarily
said to have begun in response to increased exchange and interest rate
volatility associated with the collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary
system in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 75 As market participants faced
new uncertainties, they sought both to hedge against them and to profit
from them speculatively. Some have raised the fairly undertheorized
suggestion that this trend is in some way "new," not just in the number or
complexity of transactions, but in their substance.76 But even if the change
71. Moody's, for example, in its recent annual report for shareholders, predicts that
"innovation and disintermediation will slow as capital market participants adjust to the
recent poor performance of some structured finance asset classes," but "believes that the
overall long-term outlook remains favorable." Moody's Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K),
at 9 (Mar. 2, 2009), http://ir.moodys.com/common/
download/sec.cfm?companyid=MOOD&fid = 1193125-09-41352&cik= 1059556.
72. See COP REPORT 2009, supra note 4, for a discussion of the past thirty years of
financial deregulation.
73. See, e.g., FSF 2008 REPORT, supra note 5, at 5 (arguing that the causes of the crisis,
in addition to long-running boom markets and very low interest rates, included "a wave of
financial innovation, which expanded the system's capacity to generate credit assets and
leverage, but outpaced its capacity to manage the associated risks").
74. See PETER L. BERNSTEIN, CAPITAL IDEAS: THE IMPROBABLE ORIGINS OF MODERN
WALL STREET 269-306 (1992) (describing the invention of new financial products since the
1970s); MERTON H. MILLER, FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS AND MARKET VOLATILITY 3-21, 33-
51 (1991) (providing an overview of financial innovations from 1970 to 1990 and describing
their relation to market volatility).
75. Charles R.P. Pouncy, Contemporary Financial Innovation: Orthodoxy and
Alternatives, 51 SMU L. REV. 505, 549 (1998); see also SINCLAIR, supra note 5, at 26-27
(discussing the economic changes in the post-Bretton Woods world).
76. But see, e.g., Pouncy, supra note 75, at 519-21 (noting innovative transactions
dating back thousands of years). Though it is not much acknowledged, financial innovation
is simply one facet of the larger phenomenon of legal innovations, which have been
omnipresent in Anglo-American law. As an example, consider the development of the
limited partnership with a thinly capitalized corporate general partner that is owned and
controlled by the limited partners. That expedient combined flexible management, full and
limited liability, and pass-through taxation at a time when that combination was supposed to
be unavailable-and did so with the blessing of the courts. See, e.g., Frigidaire Sales Corp.
v. Union Props., Inc., 562 P.2d 244, 245 (Wash. 1977) (holding that limited partners are not
liable to creditors even if the partners serve as officers, directors, or shareholders in the
corporate general partner). The complexity of that scheme pales in comparison with more
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is only one of degree, it seems that in their complexity,7 7 in their vast
numbers and dollar amounts,78 and in the systemic risk they pose,79 the
recent transactional acrobatics meant to address multiple regulatory limits. See, e.g.,
Thomas F. Blackwell, The Revolution Is Here: The Promise of a Unified Business Entity
Code, 24 J. CORP. L. 333, 337 n.13 (1999) (describing a transaction where, in order to
maximize limited liability, tax savings, and access to federal farm subsidies, a lawyer
created seven separate, interrelated juridical entities to comprise a business that otherwise
would have been a small three-man farming partnership with comparatively few assets).
Having learned the hard way that lawyers will always be able to work their way out of
boxes like these, most policymakers have now cried uncle, at least with respect to business-
entity law. Business-entity statutes now mostly emphasize maximum possible flexibility.
See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.32 (2005) (allowing closely held corporations to do
away with a board of directors, officers, and most other traditional trappings of corporate
governance); REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 103(b) (1997) (providing that just a handful of
provisions throughout the entire Act are nonwaivable).
Legal innovations are also very ancient. See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO
ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY (3d ed. 1990) (recounting the history of the common law as
mainly one of lawyerly subterfuges meant to overcome rules, including not only tax and
other financial regulation, but also procedural rules in litigation, constraints on alienation of
real property, forms of action, and many other areas). Plentiful other ancient examples are
easy to find, such as the development of a shadow law of agency in Rome to overcome the
requirement of purely personal contracting and the long history of evasion of the medieval
ban on usury. See Wolfram Mfiller-Freienfels, Legal Relations in the Law of Agency:
Power of Agency and Commercial Certainty, 13 AM. J. COMP. L. 193 (1964); Brian M.
McCall, Unprofitable Lending: Modern Credit Regulation and the Lost Theory of Usury, 30
CARDOZO L. REV. 549, 569-80 (2008).
All such innovations, financial and otherwise, reflect Pound's familiar distinction
between "law in books and law in action." As he said, there sometimes comes to be a
"distinction between law in the books and law in action"-some way in which the arid,
theoretical law in the minds of judges and lawyers simply has not kept pace with changing
society. Time and again the law has handled such a problem by adopting some new legal
fiction, and Pound said that fictions "show where and how legal theory has yielded to the
pressure of lay ideas and lay conduct." Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44
AM. L. REV. 12, 14-15 (1910).
77. A level of sophistication not previously seen appears to have surfaced in the 1970s.
Admittedly, it was quite a while ago that Adolf Berle first wrote that the securities of his day
had gotten so complex that they were difficult to value. ADOLF A. BERLE JR., STUDIES IN
THE LAW OF CORPORATION FINANCE 110-13 (1928). But whereas Berle was talking about
securities that now seem commonplace-convertible bonds and preferred shares with
changing dividend and conversion rights-innovation since the 1960s has involved
transactions that are difficult to even conceptualize. The change arose when financial
economics finally came into its own because the computing power that first became
available to financial firms at that time made it possible to model and estimate risks that
humans could not otherwise manage. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 74, at 37-38; PARTNOY,
supra note 53, at 15; Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 715, 717-20 (recounting the rise
and professionalization of modem finance theory, which began only about mid-century).
78. See PARTNOY, supra note 53 (setting out extensive data on magnitude of recent
innovation).
79. Additionally, as recent events suggest, the current wave of innovation poses risks
not just to investors but to whole economies. Financial panics have come and gone
throughout the history of capitalism and at one time were comparatively routine. See
generally CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT Z. ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS AND CRASHES:
A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES (5th ed. 2005). However, since the 1970s events with
systemic significance have become alarmingly frequent. In a recent speech, former Federal
Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker estimated that since then they have occurred about every
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deals that have now become commonplace are unlike anything that has
come before. Theorists attribute the phenomenon to many causes. A
popular explanation is that it helps evade regulation, 80 and although it
explains much of the behavior, it cannot be the only explanation. 81 At a
minimum, a theory of innovation as evasion should be expanded to include
all changes in exogenous financial constraints both private and public.
In any case, this recent wave of financial innovation has posed major,
unambiguous problems, and some of them are centrally relevant here.
First, financial innovation has been implicated in the uncommonly large
number of financial crises of the past twenty years. It seems acknowledged
that systemic risk in financial markets has increased, and while debate will
continue as to what role financial innovation has played in that increase, it
seems intuitively obvious that the evolution of very risky instruments of
extremely opaque complexity, also representing very large dollar values,
bear some causal relationship to it.82  Next, newness in and of itself
necessarily frustrates risk assessment. Like all risk-assessment methods,
the techniques currently available estimate risk on the basis of past
performance.83 Finally, the complexity of financial transactions now
five years. See Paul A. Volcker, Address at the Economic Club of New York (Apr. 8,
2008), available at econclubny.org/files/TranscriptLVolckerApril_2008.pdf. Prior to that
time, there had been none since the Great Depression. See COP REPORT 2009, supra note 4,
at 8; Michael Bordo et al., Is the Crisis Problem Growing More Severe?, 32 ECON. POL'Y
53, 56 & fig. 1 (2001). For example, the use of derivatives has connected scores of parties to
the performance of individual pools of MBS. Reliance upon credit ratings as triggering
events for these derivatives gave the downgrade of a single MBS pool systemic reach.
80. See MILLER, supra note 74, at 5-6; S.I. Greenbaum & C.F. Haywood, Secular
Change in the Financial Services Industry, 3 J. MONEY, CREDIT& BANKING 571 (1971).
81. For example, innovations have frequently addressed shortages in existing forms of
money that could not satisfy the needs of growth. Richard Sylla, Monetary Innovation and
Crises in American Economic History, in CRISES IN THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL
STRUCTURE 23 (Paul Wachtel ed., 1982) (describing how financial innovations addressed
money shortages throughout U.S. history); Mark B. Greenlee & Thomas J. Fitzpatrick IV,
Reconsidering the Application of the Holder in Due Course Rule to Home Mortgage Notes,
41 UCC L.J. 225, 229 & n.1 1 (2009). See generally JAMES WILLARD HURST, A LEGAL
HISTORY OF MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1774-1970 (1973) (detailing government
involvement). Likewise, the exchange and interest rates of the 1970s are thought to have
encouraged innovation for hedging purposes and coincided with the first swaps agreements.
See Pouncy, supra note 75, at 527-31 (discussing the use and rise of currency swaps to
transfer surplus liquidity and for hedging purposes); id. at 548-56 (discussing the Bretton
Woods collapse and its detrimental effect on foreign exchange and interest rates).
Moreover, the argument is subject to this empirical counterpoint: U.S. financial innovation
seems, by all accounts, to have exploded during the past few decades, while at the same
time regulation of the U.S. financial sector has shriveled.
82. See PARTNOY, supra note 53, at 3 (arguing that risk is abundant and the
"appearance of control in financial markets [is] a fiction"); COP REPORT 2009, supra note
4, at 3, 11-19 (noting the various ways that financial risk has not been adequately
regulated).
83. See PARTNOY, supra note 53, at 399-402 (discussing "value at risk" simulation and
other risk-forecasting models). This causes an obvious problem. If the risks of new
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plainly represents an independent problem in and of itself.
84
Second, disintermediation poses related problems. Bank loans were
once the dominant means by which money was borrowed and lent. Banks
therefore mediated between those who had funds to lend-depositors and
shareholders-and those who sought to borrow them. Banks were also
regulated as to their own soundness and were highly incentivized to
exercise caution toward their loans because their own money was at risk.
In the past few decades the picture has changed dramatically, with
substantially less household wealth in traditional depositary institutions and
much more of it moving to borrowers through investment funds and direct
investment in debt securities and other financial instruments.85
This process is related to financial innovation in that banks find
themselves, to a much greater extent than ever before, engaged in other
financial-services businesses. Moreover, banks, their erstwhile depositors,
and borrowers have found exposure to much more complex and risky
financial products than was the case when lending was dominated by bank
loans. Banks have also found innovative instruments-not only RMBS and
other ABS, but also various derivatives-a more attractive means of
freeing up their balance sheets and lowering regulatory capital.86
Admittedly, a case could be made that the CROs' role in the present
crisis was idiosyncratic, and that the reason why CROs failed so
significantly was because they had a special role in structured transactions
that is unlikely to repeat itself. The very purpose of securitization is to
raise money for less than would be possible if the underlying collateral
were held on balance sheets. Thus, a high credit rating is a sine qua non-
a fact that all participants and observers freely admit.87 However, there is
products could be easily and accurately modeled based on past products, the new products
would not likely be very innovative.
84. This obviously has been the case for retail consumers, but it also has been true to
some significant degree for investors who should have been quite sophisticated. See id.
Moreover, there is some evidence that, at least sometimes, complexity was generated for the
very purpose of defrauding investors or concealing risk. See id.
85. See SINCLAIR, supra note 5, at 54-57 (discussing the change to disintermediation).
See generally Biagio Bossone, Do Banks Have a Future? A Study on Banking and Finance
as We Move into the Third Millennium, 25 J. BANKING & FIN. 2239 (2001) (discussing the
future role of the banking industry in the context of banks' special ability to sell their own
debt). A similar trend can be observed in the ways consumers save for retirement. In the
past, they would collect a pension paid from a company-owned, professionally managed
portfolio. Today consumers more often own, and largely design, their own investment
portfolios.
86. SINCLAIR, supra note 5, at 57; see also Bossone, supra note 85, at 2265-66 (stating
how banks adapted to decreased demand in their traditional services).
87. See Petrina R. Dawson, Ratings Games with Contingent Transfer: A Structured
Finance Illusion, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 381, 385 (1998) ("A structured financing
seeks to insulate transactions from entities that are rated lower than the transaction, are
unrated, or for which the rating is unable to quantify the likelihood of bankruptcy.");
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no meaningful reason to believe either that innovation will somehow stop,
or that CROs will fail to remain at the center of innovation and its various
threats. Indeed, they will actively and aggressively encourage it.
Ominously, Moody's told its investors in early 2008-after the current
collapse was well under way-that the company's future profitability
depended on "[r]estoring investor confidence in structured products" and
continued "disintermediation of financial systems."88
III. OVERARCHING PROBLEMS: THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION AND
THE MISSING EVIDENCE OF VALUE
Again, the most acute policy question in the CRO debate is whether
private credit rating improves capital market efficiency or reduces systemic
risk. As has now become apparent, the CROs drastically underestimated
ABS risk, often because of facially apparent inadequacies in the
assumptions and approaches of their risk-assessment models. 89 This was
only the latest in a long series of failures. Even beyond the major systemic
failures of traditional corporate ratings in 2000 and 2001 and structured
finance ratings in 2007 and 2008, there is evidence of overarching
problems with the CRO system. As this Article will now show, none of
this should be unexpected. There is, first of all, a seriously lacking
theoretical basis for the existence of the CROs and for the hope that their
work will provide new information to markets valuable enough to justify
their substantial costs. But even if there were such a theoretical
justification, the extensive empirical literature on credit ratings has failed to
find much evidence that it adds valuable information to capital markets.
The question why CROs exist and whether they are likely to perform
well is basically a question of industrial organization. On the one hand, no
Kettering, supra note 56, at 1564-80 (explaining the securitization process from the
viewpoint of a critic).
88. 2007 Annual Report Form 10-K, supra note 20, at 3.
89. For example, CROs maintained that the default probabilities for residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) and CDOs were consistent with historic corporate bond
performance. It was not until there were demonstrably significant differences in the
performance history of RMBS and CDOs, when compared to corporate bonds, that CROs
developed asset-specific default probability tables. See SEC 2008 STAFF REPORT, supra note
3, at 36.
This may have driven CROs to increase projected losses in 2008. For instance, in
2008 Moody's increased its projected losses on subprime RMBS significantly. In
September 2008, Moody's increased its projected losses on 2006 vintage subprime pools by
22%. JONATHAN POLANSKY ET AL., MOODY'S INVESTOR SERV., SUBPRIME RMBS Loss
PROJECTION UPDATE 1 (2008), available at
http://www.moodys.com/moodys/cust/research/MDCdocs/18/2007300000533405.pdf. The
same report illustrated that nine- to twelve-month default rates on loans rose when they had
been expected to taper off from the third quarter of 2005 through the second quarter of
2007. Id. at 2 fig. 1.
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one actually knows how capital markets produce so much information and
price assets so efficiently (most of the time), but it is taken for granted that
it is costly for someone to gather and analyze the information. It seems to
make sense that the job would involve returns to scale and that it might be
best to centralize the various necessary investments in one or a few
producers rather than maintain duplicative analytical capacity with each
investor. This was a central claim of the original Gilson and Kraakman
formulation,9" and it has been a frequent theoretical justification for the
CROs.91 On the other hand, centralizing the job poses several predictable
and thorny problems. An obvious problem is free riding on the public-
goods nature of information, which is exacerbated by the fact that securities
research is quite costly.92 Therefore, a central difficulty is how to pay for
centralized analysis. Conflicts of interest are severe when issuers pay, but
collective action problems are severe when investors pay.93 We have no
experience with a government-pays model of securities information, but it
would likely pose significant problems of efficient investment in
information (even if it were politically feasible).
Regardless of who pays, however, there will also be a severe agency cost
problem. Other things being equal, intermediaries would prefer to invest
less in the quality of their product. While it is commonly argued that they
will thereby be penalized when the poor quality of their information is
disclosed, that argument presumes competitive markets. CRO markets
have been highly concentrated during the industry's entire history, a fact
that may be explained by reasons other than regulatory barrier to entry.
There is also no particular reason to believe that this persistently
concentrated market is likely to behave competitively. If returns to scale
and scope are significant and established reputation is an important asset,
entry barriers might ordinarily lead to oligopolies like the one presently
observed. The agency problem also probably cannot feasibly be addressed
by giving intermediaries some fiduciary obligation of care because the pool
of plaintiffs potentially enforcing such a duty is the entire investing
public.94 Likewise, a duty of care could theoretically be enforced by the
90. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 592-609.
91. See White, supra note 5, at 43-44 (arguing that the complexity of the information
needing analysis necessitates CROs); Gregory Husisian, What Standard of Care Should
Govern the World's Shortest Editorials?: An Analysis of Bond Rating Agency Liability, 75
CORNELL L. REv. 411,415-25 (1990) (outlining the various rationale for CROs' existence).
92. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
93. See Choi & Fisch, supra note 14, at 278-83.
94. There is also the problem of the First Amendment as currently construed. See infra
notes 134-35 and accompanying text. Admittedly, there is no reason that some sort of more
enforceable civil liability scheme could not be part of an overall strategy for better
intermediation. Cf Greenlee & Fitzpatrick, supra note 81 (explaining how assignee liability
can incentivize care); see also infra Part VI.C. The point here is that merely making it
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government, perhaps by establishing minimum standards all CROs must
meet when evaluating issues. This simple solution, however, ignores the
immense challenge the government would face in reviewing the roughly
20,000 new ratings issued each year by each of the major CROs. Even if
the government only investigated ratings about which it received
complaints, which would still require significant resources, the issue of
creating effective penalties for violations of a duty of care still poses a
significant problem. In short, it is very hard to imagine how an
intermediary service could be organized so as both to fully compensate an
efficient amount of investment in analysis and ensure its quality.
An even more significant problem is that the basic argument above-the
argument that information gathering is so costly and likely to favor scale
that there must be institutional intermediaries-begs a serious empirical
question. Markets themselves are machines for generating information,
and from the viewpoint of some finance economists, they ought to be really
good at it.95  While the major CROs are often privy to nonpublic
disclosures from the issuers they rate and have a special regulatory
dispensation to receive it, the major CROs sometimes, and the smaller
CROs almost always, base their ratings only on public information.
96 That
easier for individual investors to sue the CROs for negligent ratings will pose the same
problems that have burdened shareholder securities litigation generally. It is extremely
difficult, to say the least, to strike a balance between a penalty that is economically
meaningful enough to discourage CROs from allowing the quality of their ratings to slack
and not so economically burdensome that the business of issuing credit ratings would no
longer be economically viable. In any case, economically meaningful penalties are likely to
drive up the cost of credit ratings. Unless such penalties improve the accuracy of credit
ratings, this increased cost will further diminish the actual value credit ratings add to
markets. There also likely would remain the problematic need to make out a culpable
mental state and the persistent judicial perception that shareholder suits are frivolous. See
infra notes 157-67, 198 and accompanying text. Of course, any government-enforced
standard does nothing to make whole those actors who rely on credit ratings when making
investment decisions. The argument that relying on credit ratings when making investment
decisions is inherently unreasonable, an argument which many courts inexplicably accept, is
off base in a regulatory environment that requires investors to rely heavily on credit ratings
when making investment decisions.
95. To wit, the unassailable orthodoxy among finance economists from the 1960s until
fairly recently was that modem capital markets approximate perfect efficiency, meaning that
the pricing of capital assets very quickly and very completely incorporated all relevant
information. See generally ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 1 (2000). That hypothesis, as Shleifer explores at great length, is
now in doubt.
96. The "dispensation," again, is that in the United States the NRSROs are exempt
from Regulation FD. See supra note 28. Moreover, as to whatever nonpublic information
they receive and incorporate into their ratings, they depend entirely on issuers for its
reliability and have no mechanism for enforcing honest disclosure. For example, evidence
is surfacing suggesting that arrangers did not disclose reports about the declining loan
quality in pools of RMBS to CROs. See, e.g., Chris Arnold, Auditor: Supervisors Covered
Up Risky Loans, NAT'L PUB. RADIO, May 27, 2008,
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is, there is not actually that much of a theoretical basis for the view that
market participants cannot simply do for themselves what the CROs do, all
on the basis of publicly available data.
In any case, wholly aside from the lack of a theoretical foundation, there
is also a lack of empirical evidence of the value that is supposedly added by
private credit ratings. While highly rated bonds have low default rates and
enjoy yields consistent with low risk,97 and while some commentators take
this as evidence of the CROs' successful performance, 98 the evidence
suggests that at best they just barely meet the markets' own success at
predicting bond values. Hickman's pioneer study found that during the
first half of the twentieth century, when the instruments under review were
much simpler than they are now and bond markets were working extremely
well, the CROs did only about as well at predicting defaults as did the
markets themselves.99 While arguably the results have been somewhat
mixed, extensive empirical literature dating to the late 1950s has failed to
find more than a small portion of bond price and yield performance that
cannot be explained on the basis of simple, publicly available financial
data. 00  Moreover, post-issue ratings changes are particularly
uninformative. The single most robust and well-tested empirical result has
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=90840958; Patrick Rucker, Wall
Street Often Shelved Damaging Subprime Reports, REUTERS, July 27, 2007,
http://www.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idUSN2743515820070727.
97. See HICKMAN, supra note 34, at 7-12; Louis H. Ederington & Jess B. Yawitz, The
Bond Rating Process, in HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS 41 (Edward
I. Altman ed., 6th ed. 1987) (canvassing prior studies and concluding that approximately
two-thirds of new issue ratings can be predicted on the basis of a handful of publicly
available accounting measures); Richard R. West, Bond Ratings, Bond Yields and Financial
Regulation: Some Findings, 16 J.L. & ECON. 159 (1973); see also Lawrence Fisher,
Determinants of Risk Premiums on Corporate Bonds, 67 J. POL. ECON. 217 (1959) (finding
that about three-quarters of risk premiums on corporate bonds studied could be explained by
simple, publicly available financial data); Pu Liu & Anjan V. Thakor, Interest Yields, Credit
Ratings, and Economic Characteristics of State Bonds: An Empirical Analysis, 16 J. MONEY
CREDIT & BANKING 344 (1984) (concluding that while ratings themselves have a statistically
significant, independent effect on yield, straightforward economic factors reliably predict
municipal bond ratings).
98. See, e.g., Rousseau, supra note 10, at 631; Schwarcz, supra note 10, at 13-14.
99. See HICKMAN, supra note 34, at 7-12 (determining that bond markets performed
remarkably well during the first half of the twentieth century, notwithstanding its many
disruptions). As a check on his results, Hickman matched them against CROs' predictions
of default risk and found them to track closely with market-derived yield spreads. See
generally Sylla, supra note 16, at 12-13 (summarizing Hickman's results and their
significance for measuring the CROs' performance).
100. See supra note 96. The results are "mixed" only in that researchers have been
unable to explain all bond performance variation. The as-yet unexplained variation might
reflect some informational value in ratings. Importantly, even if the unexplained variation is
associated with ratings, some of that effect is to be explained by the purely regulatory effect
of "fallen angels"-bonds being downgraded from investment- to speculative-grade. See
West, supra note 97.
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been that bond prices and returns tend reliably to anticipate ratings changes
some months before the change.10 Furthermore, substantial literature
shows that ratings changes can be predicted using simple ratios based on
publicly available financial statements. 10 2 Even when ratings changes are
not anticipated by the market, there is only a significant change in price
when downgrades occur, which may simply reflect the increased funding
costs that accompany lower credit ratings. Empirical evidence also
suggests that investors find ratings to be of little intrinsic value.'0 3
Finally, the operation of the dominant CROs under the two-rating norm
and the issuer-pays model, along with the distortions caused by the
NRSRO designation, have been very expensive. Even if CROs perform
exactly as well as other market measures, any cost advantages of their
particular form of organization would have to be truly significant to explain
their large fees and justify their extensive use by policymakers.
101. See Covitz & Harrison, supra note 10; John R.M. Hand et al., The Effect of Bond
Rating Agency Announcements on Bond and Stock Prices, 47 J. FIN. 733 (1992); Gailen Hite
& Arthur Warga, The Effect of Bond-Rating Changes on Bond Price Performance, 53 FIN.
ANALYSTS J. 35 (1997) (arguing that other interesting effects that have repeatedly been
shown are that the "pre-announcement effect" is much stronger for downgrades than for
upgrades, and that the effect is much more pronounced as to bonds that are already poorly
rated); Mark I. Weinstein, The Effect of a Rating Change Announcement on Bond Price, 5 J.
FIN. ECON. 329 (1977). Ratings changes are similarly anticipated by stock price changes.
See George E. Pinches & J. Clay Singleton, The Adjustment of Stock Prices to Bond Rating
Changes, 33 J. FIN. 29 (1978) (stating that ratings changes are similarly anticipated by stock
price changes). At least one recent study argues that CRO ratings add value by insuring
against bad equilibriums, especially after a firm has been placed on a credit watch. See
Arnoud W.A. Boot, Todd T. Milbourn, & Anjolein Schmeits, Credit Ratings as
Coordination Mechanisms, 19 REV. FIN. STUD. 81 (2006). However, the authors concede a
few points that significantly detract from this assertion. First, ratings only add value if a
significant portion of institutional investors "agree" with the rating by purchasing the
securities, suggesting that it is their participation, and not the rating, that adds information to
the market. Second, they argue that credit ratings are most valuable when institutional-
investor beliefs are divergent, while also pointing out that if beliefs are too divergent, credit
ratings will no longer play a coordinating role. If it were truly the ratings rather than the
institutional-investor behavior acting as a market coordinator, then the coordinating role of
credit ratings should not break down when institutional-investor beliefs diverge.
102. See, e.g., Chan & Jegadeesh, supra note 10, at 156-58, 163-68 (summarizing
relevant literature and providing new findings on the different approaches used to predict
bond ratings).
103. See H. Kent Baker & Sattar A. Mansi, Assessing Credit Rating Agencies by Bond
Issuers and Institutional Investors, 29 J. Bus. FIN. & ACCT. 1367 (2002) (reporting survey
evidence that demonstrates that the majority of institutional investors rely more on in-house
analysis than CROs' reports); David M. Ellis, Different Sides of the Same Story: Investors'
and Issuers' Views of Rating Agencies, 7 J. FIXED INCOME 35 (1998) (noting survey
evidence of investor skepticism of CROs' ratings).
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IV. OTHER OVERARCHING PROBLEMS WITH THE CROS AS THEY EXIST
A. Conflicts of Interest
Policy discussions on the CROs usually begin with conflicts of interest.
The issuer-pays model is the most frequently identified conflict, and
indeed, the SEC nominally identifies issuer-pays as a "conflict of interest"
as a matter of law. 104 As a matter of fact, notwithstanding that for many
years the major CROs have all maintained procedures and internal conduct
codes designed to constrain conflicts, new evidence suggests that, at least
in recent years, conflict problems were rife.
10 5
Changes in the concentrated, disintermediated U.S. banking industry
have exacerbated these problems. It may be true, as the CROs often claim,
that the fee charged for any one rating is too small a portion of overall
revenue to create a conflict. However, U.S. investment banking is now so
concentrated that a handful of firms are responsible for arranging and
underwriting the bulk of large new debt issues, and they typically select the
CRO. 0 6 This is borne out in internal CRO conversations about retaliation
by issuers for unfavorable ratings treatment. 1
07
104. See Securities Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(b)(1) (2008) (prohibiting all
"conflicts of interest" and defining issuer-pays as a conflict of interest, with the exception of
conflicts that are disclosed in filings with the SEC so long as the NRSRO maintains some
internal conflict-of-interest policy).
105. As highlighted in the SEC 2008 Staff Report, some CROs' analysts have still
participated in fee discussions with issuers. Likewise, while bonuses are determined by
individual performance and the overall success of the firm rather than ratings, analysts are
aware of the CROs' interest in securing individual ratings deals and market share, and have
considered these factors when making ratings methodology decisions. See SEC 2008 STAFF
REPORT, supra note 3, at 24-26.
The SEC staff also found evidence of CROs' analytical staff taking specific actions
possibly driven by such conflicts. For instance, CROs would also make adjustments outside
of their ratings models without documenting the rationale for the adjustment. Id. at 14
(showing that these adjustments appear to have raised ratings, and "[o]ne rating agency
regularly reduced loss expectations on subprime second lien mortgages from the loss
expectations output by its RMBS model, in some cases reducing the expected loss"). CROs
also failed to consistently document committee composition, actions, and decisions. Often
missing from CROs' documents were vote tallies from rating-committee rating votes,
documentation of any ratings surveillance, committee memos or minutes, or both, and other
relevant documentation even when required. There was, at times, no documentation of
committee attendees. See id at 19-20.
106. As to structured products, for example, the CROs were heavily dependent on fees
from a small number of arrangers within the concentrated U.S. investment banking industry.
See id. at 32 (finding that twelve arrangers accounted for nearly all of one large sample of
structured deals rated by the major CROs). The banking industry has already concentrated
further since the downturn of early 2008, and yet more failures and consolidations are
widely expected. Until the credit collapse that began in mid-2007, a huge and rapidly
growing portion of the major CROs' revenues comprised fees from rating securitized bonds
issued by a handful of major banks.
107. Privately, CROs express concerns that methodology or modeling changes will
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Likewise, financial innovation introduces a wholly new conflict of
interest, and at the same time it makes the job of prospective credit rating
more difficult-or as some critics say, impossible. Financial-market
acceptance of some innovative product can promise large returns to the
CROs, 10 8 incentivizing CROs to encourage that acceptance. In the case of
structured products, they have gone out of their way to do so.'09 Critics
who have long claimed that the CROs overrated structured products may
now be vindicated. 10 For instance, there is evidence that CROs themselves
believed they should not have been rating some structured products."'
drive away business, and they have considered revisiting ratings methodology in order to
recapture market share from other CROs. See id. at 25-26. For instance, one employee
stated "[w]e are meeting with your group this week to discuss adjusting criteria for rating
CDOs of real estate assets this week because of the ongoing threat of losing deals." Id.
(citation omitted). Another employee responded, stating that aspects of the ratings
methodology would have to be revisited to recapture market share from another CRO. Id.
Moreover, at least one CRO has allowed deals in the process of being rated to use old rating
criteria when new rating criteria had been introduced. Id. at 32.
108. The revenues CROs received from rating RMBS and CDOs substantially increased
from 2002 to 2006. In each year from 2004 to 2007, the three major CROs saw their
revenue from such ratings increase between 50% and 150% when compared to the same
revenue stream in 2002. Id. at 10-11. In 2006, when the revenue from rating RMBS and
CDOs was at its highest, Moody's generated $6 million per employee. See Gerard Caprio,
Jr. et al., The 2007 Meltdown in Structured Securitization: Searching for Lessons Not
Scapegoats 19 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 4,756, 2008);
Buttonwood: Credit and Blame, ECONOMIST, Sept. 8, 2007, at 77 (noting that CROs
experienced revenue increases of $754 million); see also Moody's Corp., Annual Report
(Form 10-K), at 21 (Mar. 1, 2007), http://ir.moodys.com/common/
download/download.c fm?companyid=MOOD&fileid = 165514&filekey=E3CB9ABB-700C-
46FF-B2CA-DF3296084E4F&filename=200610K.pdf (documenting that in 2006 more than
45% of Moody's revenue was generated from rating structured-finance products, such as
RMBS and CDOs); Gretchen Morgenson, Debt Watchdogs: Tamed or Caught Napping?,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2008, at Al (reporting that fees received for rating structured-finance
products far exceed other products, and that as such ratings increase, so do CROs' operating
margins).
109. From 2003 to 2007, S&P, for example, actively publicized evidence that they much
more frequently upgraded their ratings of subprime MBSs than they downgraded them,
thereby urging investor confidence in these untried new products. See Kathleen C. Engel &
Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of Predatory Lending, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2055-56 (2006) (surveying S&P's own public statements as to its
upgrade and downgrade activity). S&P's claims in this literature were doubly misleading.
First, CROs in fact almost never changed their ratings of MBSs or other securitized products
until mid-2007, when they downgraded masses of them. The few hundred ratings changes
discussed in the 2003-2007 literature represented a tiny fraction of the tens to hundreds of
thousands of such ratings they had issued. Second, as we shall see in some detail below, the
CROs in fact did not make initial ratings that were at all conservative and, by and large,
seem now to acknowledge that their ratings of these products were substantially over-
optimistic. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
110. See, e.g., AAAsking for Trouble, ECONOMIST, July 14, 2007, at 77; Sold Down the
River Rhine, ECONOMIST, Aug. 11, 2007, at 66 (showing that some of these tranches were
originally rated only a year or two before the downgrade, prompting comments that the
sudden downgrade was a "belated recognition that such ratings always were a bit dubious").
111. In April 2007, correspondence between two CRO analysts emerged. One analyst
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Moreover, working relationships have been much closer in the context of
structured finance ratings where CROs work with issuers to reach a rating
satisfactory to the issuer. 12  This arrangement mirrors the way that
accounting firms sold their clients management-consulting services before
Sarbanes-Oxley prohibited the practice because of the conflicts of interest
it created.
The CROs have sought to discount these problems on several grounds,
but none so far seems availing, especially in light of their recent failures.
They have long claimed that their internal procedures adequately contain
conflicts, but recent evidence suggests those procedures were not
effective. 1 3 They also defend their roles in various crises by pointing to
their disclosures and warnings to investors,' 14 but their warnings were
apparently undercut severely by the fact that even as they issued warnings,
they continued to rate very risky securities with very high ratings." 5 Other
criticized a deal by calling it ridiculous and advising against rating it. While those
statements seem responsible, the reply received was "it could be structured by cows and we
would rate it." Another senior analytical manager wrote that CROs were creating an "even
bigger monster-the CDO market. Let's hope we are all wealthy and retired by the time
this house of cards falters." SEC 2008 STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 12.
112. Securities issuers have some incentive to ensure a range of ratings on any one pool
of securities issued so tranches can be sold to investors seeking various levels of risk and
return. There is a much larger market for investment-grade-rated senior tranches than there
is for other tranches because that rating allows sales to portfolio-constrained institutional
investors. See The Use and Abuse of Reputation, ECONOMIST, Apr. 6, 1996, at 18; Who
Rates the Raters?, supra note 61, at 67. The senior tranches are also the least expensive to
fund due to their low coupon rate. Thus, arrangers generally attempt to create the largest
possible senior tranche. SEC 2008 STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 8.
Assuming a credit rating is in fact value added, it is theoretically not inappropriate
for CROs to work with arrangers to structure products for high ratings insofar as CROs are
simply explaining how to optimize the structure of pools. But many have persuasively
argued otherwise. See, e.g., Who Rates the Raters?, supra note 61, at 68 (citing to parallels
to the conflicts to which the auditing industry fell victim in recent history).
113. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
114. See, e.g., McDaniel Testimony, supra note 58, at 1 (claiming that Moody's warned
investors about deterioration in origination standards and inflated housing prices as early as
2003).
115. In March 2008, Bloomberg reported that Moody's and S&P were holding off on
downgrading investment-grade-rated MBS pools. By the time of the article, Moody's and
S&P downgraded nearly 10,000 subprime-mortgage tranches without publicly addressing
investment-grade-rated tranches. At the same time, evidence suggested that nearly $120
billion in investment-grade-rated bonds should have been downgraded if the companies
followed their own formulas. See Mark Pittman, Moody's, S&P Defer Cuts on AAA
Subprime, Hiding Loss, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 11, 2008,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20670001&sid=areM7a9s02ko. A month later,
Moody's downgraded nearly 2,000 tranches in two days. See Paul Jackson, Stick a Fork in
It: Moody's Downgrades 1,923 Subprime RMBS Classes-In Just Two Days, HOUSING
WIRE, Apr. 22, 2008, http://www.housingwire.com/2008/04/22/stick-a-fork-in-it. The fact
that such a high percentage of the mortgages in these pools were defaulting or going into
foreclosure one to two years into a thirty-year maturity period calls into question their initial
investment-grade ratings.
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attempts to discount conflicts seem similarly flawed.' 1
6
Finally, the CROs argue that whatever its downsides, issuer-pays makes
ratings available to the entire public at no cost, reducing the advantages of
wealthy investors.117 Whatever benefits that may produce, accuracy of the
ratings is more important than their wide availability, especially given their
incorporation into portfolio rules. Moreover, large investors will retain
advantages, such as in-house analytical capabilities, despite the availability
of credit ratings. Individuals would be better served by the availability of
more accurate ratings to the institutional investment managers who invest
on their behalves.
B. Doubts About "Reputational Capital"
The CROs and their defenders argue that the best assurance of their
integrity is their need to preserve "reputational capital," an argument that is
at odds with the recent evidence. 18 There are also several other reasons to
doubt this argument. First, the major CROs have until very recently
enjoyed the significant entry barrier of NRSRO designation and, as will be
argued later, would probably enjoy significant entry protection in its
absence as well." 9 Therefore, because of this lack of effective price
116. Moody's, for example, argues that regardless of who pays for ratings, investors
would be motivated to encourage inflated ratings to improve the marketability of their
bonds, to improve their existing portfolio values, or to establish new portfolio positions. See
McDaniel Testimony, supra note 58, at 8-10. This seems very implausible. Under an
investor-pays model, even assuming investors could exert the same influence as issuers,
different investors have different incentives and would thus pressure the CROs differently.
Moreover, institutional buyers constrained by fiduciary duties would not desire artificially
inflated ratings because paper gains have no intrinsic value to those investors, and may
actually be liablilities.
Moody's argues that because investors are frequently also issuers, there is no
meaningful distinction between them. See id. at 9. First, one cannot help but wonder why
CROs have expressed such a strong preference to have issuer-pays if there is no meaningful
distinction between investors and issuers. This position only makes sense if every issuer is
the exclusive investor in its own issue. Otherwise, the issuer and investor are meaningfully
distinct. As to more complex products, in particular, the issuer knows more about the
quality of the assets than the investor, and CROs are supposed to help reduce that
asymmetry. The investors most in need of guidance from CROs would seem to be those
without sufficient in-house analytical capacity of their own, but that likely describes a large
number of buy-side investors. Finally, a large number of investors simply are not issuers,
and so Moody's argument really just begs a large empirical question: whether the interests
of the buy side and sell side are evenly enough matched to make conflicts a wash.
Impressionistically, it seems like the assumption implied is wrong.
117. See id.
118. See supra notes 104-07, 111 and accompanying text (documenting internal
evidence from CROs of gross conflicts of interest and the rating of products that CRO staff
believed to be unratable).
119. See infra note 148 and accompanying text. A minor puzzle might seem to be that,
while reputational capital has not been a meaningful constraint on CRO behavior, the
establishment of reputation works as an entry barrier. And yet both things seem to be the
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competition, the lethargy characteristic of monopolies may shield them
from competitive pressures that otherwise would encourage service
quality. 20 Second, CROs are likely susceptible to the "herd" behavior for
which there is now growing evidence in financial markets. Analytical
intermediaries apparently fear individual mistakes much more than
collective ones. Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that securities
analysts' career prospects are improved more by systematic overoptimism
than by accuracy, a fact that may influence the work of CROs' analytical
staffers. 2 1  Third, the extensive documentation of conflicts of interest
within the CROs is strong counterfactual evidence to the hypothesis that
the need to preserve reputational capital is an adequate check on their
behavior.
There is often no particularly good reason to believe that a given issuer
needs a reputational intermediary at all, especially one as expensive as the
major CROs. Major debt issuers can anticipate frequently repeated
interactions in debt markets and will forecast the need for low-cost debt
funding far into the foreseeable future.1 22 Also, reputational constraints
should have been important for the major auditing firms as well, but recent
events have shown that to have not been the case. 
1 23
C. Resource Constraints: Coping with Complexity and Rapid Change
Resource constraints have been a running problem, and they may be to
blame for some of the worst problems in the ratings of structured products.
The long-standing criticism of inadequate analytical staff124 became severe
case. A likely explanation is based on network effects. Despite evidence that investors do
not value the information content of ratings, see supra note 103, they incorporate the ratings
of specific CROs in private contracts and private portfolio investment rules. While it
remains an empirical question why precisely they do so, it seems likely that a CRO's
"reputation" can have some consequences beyond any marketplace confidence in the
informational value of its work.
120. See generally RiCHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 18-22 (2001).
121. See David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, Herd Behavior and Investment, 80
AM. ECON. REV. 465 (1990), for the preeminent research and discussion on "herding." See
also COFFEE, supra note 14, at 252-53, for detailed empirical research on the subject.
When rating complex derivative products, herding had a significant upside for the CROs,
while failing to do so had a downside. For example, some smaller CROs did not rate CDOs
because, they claim, CDOs made no sense. Yet, the major CROs profited immensely from
rating CDOs until the market discovered how poorly the ratings reflected CDO risk
characteristics. Since then the market has evaporated and the only effect not participating in
the CDO rating market had on smaller CROs was that they had no opportunity to generate
revenue from rating CDOs during the boom.
122. See Partnoy, supra note 14, at 500-01 (arguing that there will be a continuous need
for low-cost debt financing).
123. See COFFEE, supra note 14 (describing the complicity of the major auditing firms in
corporate accounting scandals since 2000).
124. See, e.g., Partnoy, supra note 11, at 651-52 (discussing structural problems modem
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during the explosion of structured finance, despite the CROs' substantial
growth during the three decades prior. 125 Their due diligence as to these
products was often poor or nonexistent,1 26 and there is evidence that the
CROs have sometimes been pressured by their clients into acting too
quickly. 127 They also failed to devote sufficient resources to surveillance
efforts.1 28 All this suggests that even the major CROs cope poorly with
CROs exhibit in the quest for reputational capital).
125. The growth of asset-backed securities from 2002 through 2006 created a demand
for credit ratings that CROs could not match. See SEC 2008 STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at
10. The SEC determined that limited resources were allocated to structured-finance groups
that focused on rating RMBS and CDO issues. Internal CROs' e-mails describe the
situation as tense. An e-mail from a senior business manager states that there was "too
much work, not enough people." Id. at 12. An e-mail from an analytical manager fleshed
out the picture, stating, "'[W]e ran our staffing model assuming the analysts are working
sixty hours a week and we are short on resources .... The analysts on average are working
longer than this and we are burning them out. We have had a couple of resignations and
expect more."' Id. (footnote omitted).
126. CROs acknowledge that originator practices could have a potentially large impact
on loan performance. See SIEGEL, supra note 59, at 2 ("Moody's continues to believe that
differences in originator practices and loan programs have the potential to have a large
influence on loan performance .... ); see also id. at 7 ("[I]t is important to examine the
quality of originator practices, particularly efforts to verify data through appraisals, credit
checks, and other means."). Nonetheless, they argued that they could assess such risks
through quantitative analysis, supplemented by superficial qualitative analysis. See MUNI &
KOTHARI, supra note 70, at 1. In fact, the three major CROs did not engage in due diligence
or otherwise verify the accuracy or quality of the loan data they reviewed. SEC 2008 STAFF
REPORT, supra note 3, at 18. Instead, they relied on information provided to them by
sponsors, which was provided to them without representations that the sponsors had
performed any sort of due diligence. Id. at 18. Moreover, the documentation required for
assets underlying rated structured securities fell over time-from 2002 to 2005, the
percentage of subprime loans rated by Moody's that fully documented borrower income fell
from 72% to 55%. MuNI & KOTHARI, supra note 70, at 2. It was not until 2008, after the
SEC published a report that noted these missteps and RMBS issuance was nearly
nonexistent, that CROs implemented more extensive reviews of originator practices. SEC
2008 STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 18.
127. See SEC 2008 STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 32. Arrangers, who are paid in part
based on the volume of deals they put together, push for a fast ratings process. See id. This
may have influenced a CRO to allow deals that were in the ratings process to continue to be
rated with old criteria, despite the introduction of new criteria by CROs during the rating.
Id.
128. See, e.g., Kettering, supra note 56, at 1674. This played out in recent corporate
bond markets, where Enron and WorldCom were rated investment-grade until days before
the collapse of the companies. Who Rates the Raters?, supra note 61, at 68-69 (noting that
by the time the Enron downgrade was issued, most bad news had come out and Enron's
share price had dropped dramatically). A recent SEC report revealed that two of the three
major CROs poorly or completely failed to document any monitoring of CDOs and RMBSs.
SEC 2008 STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 21-22 (noting that CRO surveillance efforts were
lacking in timeliness and diligence). This may not be surprising considering two of the big
three CROs had not created internal documents containing the steps necessary to monitor
CDOs and RMBS. Id.
In fact, as to structured products, the CROs apparently relied mainly on pool-level
triggers to alert them that the credit quality of the pool had significantly declined. A rating
committee will only be convened to reevaluate a rating if it appears that an issuer may be at
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rapid innovation. 129
V. WHAT CONSTRAINTS AT PRESENT?
Assuming there is something in the CROs' work that should be done
better or be better constrained, it should first be asked whether any existing
laws might be better suited to accomplish this. We think it is unlikely.
A. Big-Picture Basics, or What Exactly Are the CROs?
1. Are CROs the "Government"?
CROs perform functions that are government-like. In one respect, those
CROs with NRSRO designation make what is literally de jure law: they
decide, as a matter of law, whether particular assets may be owned by
particular regulated entities. Likewise, in the structured-finance context,
the NRSROs took on the special role of helping issuers prestructure their
deals to ensure the desired ratings for top-tranche securities. In other
words, they made essentially regulatory calls as to the internal structure of
a credit rating inconsistent with its peers. The primary trigger used was an
overcollateralization test, which measured a pool's total losses against the total dollar value
of credit enhancements. See id. at 36. The pool was considered unimpaired by losses as
long as the pool contained collateral in excess of the pool's total payment obligations to
investors. Conceptually this is a puzzling trigger, as it asserts that a pool with a payment
horizon of thirty years can lose 99% of its overcollateralization in the first year without
being a bigger credit risk than it was when created. While defaults on mortgage payments
tend to become less frequent with the passage of time, one would think a pool rapidly eating
through overcollateralization would signal a potential downgrade, or at least land it on a so-
called CRO watch list (which the major CROs maintain to publicize the fact that a
downgrade is under consideration). When credit enhancements come in the form of issuers
guaranteeing portions of the senior tranches, this trigger becomes even more tenuous. This
is because the actual value of those guarantees, especially when given by a single issuer,
may not equal the full amount of the guarantees. See BIS STRUCTURED FINANCE REPORT,
supra note 5, at 28, for a discussion about the problems with mono-line issuers providing
pool credit enhancements.
129. The complexity of structured products was apparently beyond even the largest
CRO's ability to keep up. The process of arranging and rating a pool of assets creates
information frictions at most steps in the process and poses a major lemons problem in the
CROs' ratings. See generally Adam B. Ashcraft & Til Schuermann, Understanding the
Securitization of Subprime Mortgage Credit, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. STAFF REP., Mar.
2008.
One other major problem with their handling of innovative products is lack of data.
The fundamental objective aspect of their approach, quantitative risk assessment, depends
heavily on historical data, but as to innovative products, such data will often be unavailable.
For example, CROs were rating "affordability products" like pay-option adjustable-rate
mortgages (ARMs) and interest-only (10) loans when there was not much historical
performance data on these loans from any originator. PETER MCNALLY, MOODY'S
INVESTORS SERV., UNDERSTANDING METRICS FOR PERFORMANCE MONITORING, VOLUME 3:
RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES 6 (2005), available at
http://www.moodys.com/moodys/cust/research/MDCdocs/14/2004300000425487.pdf.
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particular financial transactions. Therefore, a natural question is whether
their quasi-government status renders them subject to any special liabilities,
defenses, or privileges.
By prevailing orthodoxy, the answer is plainly no. All U.S. CROs and
most foreign ones are private, profit-making entities, and the three U.S.
majors are publicly traded corporations or subsidiaries thereof, organized
under state corporate laws. 130  Therefore, despite their influence and the
federal deputy stars they wear, it is basically inconceivable that they could
be subject to the federal constitutional or administrative rules that govern
proper agencies. 131 Likewise, because they are not federally chartered and
do not formally advise or contract with the SEC or other agencies, they are
free of the open-government constraints that bind some quasi-public
entities.132 This special status in between public and private is not unique
to the CROs. In any number of other contexts, the government has
fumbled around in search of a policy and has managed to deputize some
private group to take care of it. In those cases the group will typically be
neither democratically accountable, nor subject to public law constraints,
nor especially well regulated by private law liability. 1
33
2. On the Contrary, They Are Just Regular Folks Speaking Their Minds
Not only are CROs not the government in the eyes of the courts, but they
enjoy some First Amendment protection for their ratings. Several courts
have held that various claims of liability against CROs must fail as in
130. See supra notes 20-22.
131. Even where an entity is created by federal statute and subject to some federal
governance role, it may not be the "government" for constitutional and administrative law
purposes. Compare Reg'l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974) (holding
that the Conrail entity, a corporation created by federal statute and subject to substantial
federal control, was not a "federal instrumentality"), with Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger
Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995) (finding that the Amtrak entity, also a corporation created by
federal statute and subject to substantial federal control, was a federal instrumentality and
could be subject to the First Amendment). A fortiori the CROs have no direct government
involvement at all.
132. For example, see the Government Corporation Control Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 9101-
9110 (2006), or the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-15 (2006).
133. See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to
Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DuKE L.J. 17 (2000) (describing the
improbable rise of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers as the U.S.
federal government's wholly private means for controlling the very root systems of the
Internet); Chris Sagers, The Myth of "Privatization," 59 ADMIN. L. REv. 37 (2007)
(describing the range of entities with quasi-governmental powers but comparatively little
oversight); Chris Sagers, The Evolving Federal Approach to Private Legislation and the
Twilight of Government (Cleveland-Marshall Coll. of Law, Working Paper No. 05-117,
2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-610587 [hereinafter Sagers, Twilight]
(describing the similar power of standard-setting organizations in many contexts).
2009]
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violation of the First Amendment.'
34
The very fact of this constitutional result is a large enough problem in
itself. A frequent problem when applying First Amendment protection to
commercial behavior is the failure to consider the consequences of
mischaracterization of the entity seeking protection.' 35  However, even
under the assumption that such protection exists, the problem for the rest of
this analysis is that regulatory instruments must contend with the risk that
they are unconstitutional as applied to privately generated credit ratings.
3. But Are They Standard Setters?
Finally, one interesting and different issue is that CROs fill a role similar
to that of a whole class of other nominally private entities commonly
known as standard-setting organizations (SSOs). Like most SSOs, the
CROs establish a more or less codified policy that is binding on other
private actors by establishing formal normative guidelines of their own and
encouraging compliance with them. 136 The federal government has shown
a fairly keen interest in SSOs, and the scattered body of policies and rules
developed for them contain some slender limits that might marginally
improve the behavior of the CROs. 13 7 But it seems unlikely that any of
those policies would actually apply, 38 and while it might improve credit
ratings in some respects, it would still leave the industry with serious
problems. '39
134. These issues are pursued at greater length in Chris Sagers, Further Perversions in
First Amendment Characterization and the Metaphysics of Corporate Nature: The Case of
the Bond Rating Agencies (manuscript on file with the authors).
135. See generally id.; Christopher L. Sagers, The Legal Structure ofAmerican Freedom
and the Provenance of the Antitrust Immunities, 2002 UTAH L. REv. 927, 951-57
(examining the negative unforeseen consequences of well-intended extensions of First
Amendment protection to juridical persons).
136. See Sagers, Twilight, supra note 133, for a fuller account of federal oversight of
private standard setting.
137. Namely, the federal government has provided that it will make use of privately
adopted "standards" in both procurement and in regulation, but only if those standards are
adopted according to "consensus" procedures. Consensus procedures are those in which
affected persons are given an opportunity to participate in the standard-setting process and
afforded fairly substantial procedural protections. See Sagers, Twilight, supra note 133. In
a move only too familiar from CRARA and the SEC regulations under it, the consensus
procedures effectively mandated by the government are precisely those that had already
been in use by the most powerful SSOs for many years. See id.
138. This is so both because the work of CROs probably does not fit the definition of
"standard" currently in use in federal policy and because CROs are now separately regulated
by CRARA. See National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L.
104-113, §12(c)-(d), 110 Stat. 775, 783 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 272 note); Federal
Participation in the Development and Use of Voluntary Consensus Standards and in
Conformity Assessment Activities, 63 Fed. Reg. 8,546 (Feb. 19, 1998) (implementing the
Technology Transfer and Advancement Act).
139. Credit rating might be improved if CROs were forced to develop their
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B. CRARA and SEC Oversight: Free-Market Competition Solutions Are
Doomed
With regard to other currently existing laws, are there any that could
constrain the CROs to better performance? The only law specifically
addressing CROs is Congress's effort from a few years ago, the Credit
Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 (CRARA), which was inspired by the
corporate collapses of 2000-2001.140 CRARA is a pointedly free-market
piece of legislation; it basically has two business ends, both devoted to
decreasing concentration and improving price competition in the supply of
ratings. First, its basic remedy for better credit-rating performance is
simply to mandate the licensing of a larger number of NRSROs. 141 Shortly
after implementation of CRARA's new and more permissive licensing
process in mid-2007, the Commission granted NRSRO status to a handful
of new registrants. Second, CRARA directs the SEC to prohibit some
CRO behavior by rulemaking. 14  Congress directed the Commission to
prohibit actions it "determines to be unfair, coercive, or abusive," but
explicitly provided that the kinds of conduct to be prohibited should
include specific exclusionary practices the majors had been accused of
using to deter competition. 43  Finally, to cement its market approach,
CRARA explicitly prohibits the SEC from regulating the "substance" of
credit rating itself and preempts any state law that would do the same.
144
methodologies by consensus procedures. See Sagers, Twilight, supra note 133 (explaining
the federal requirement of "consensus" standard setting). Affected parties could participate
in making the methodologies better. The problem is again the very idea of private credit
rating intermediaries. The CROs have access to neither more nor less substantive
knowledge about prevailing finance economics theory than other participants, and they have
not demonstrated any inherent comparative advantage over other market participants in
predicting credit risk, despite their first-hand experience rating the vast majority of debt
issues. Moreover, opening their processes in such a way as to make them consensus
operations would presumably upset their profit-making business model substantially. So
while consensus procedures might improve their methodologies to some extent, the question
remains whether they could really add value that would justify their expense.
140. See supra note 9.
141. By that statute Congress for the first time established a formal, objective process by
which ratings entities could apply for NRSRO status, consistent with agitation by some for
years that the real problem in credit rating has been lack of competition. See White, supra
note 5, at 52 (discussing SEC criteria for designating NRSROs).
142. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(i) (2006).
143. Id. § 78o-7(i)(1).
144. CRARA sets a few other limits that are not directly competition-related, but they
are flimsy and virtually afterthoughts. For instance, it requires an NRSRO to establish,
maintain, and enforce policies and procedures "reasonably designed, taking into
consideration the nature of the [NRSRO 's] business.., and [that oJ] affiliated persons and
affiliated companies thereof, to address and manage conflicts of interest." 15 U.S.C. § 78o-
7(h)(1) (2006) (emphases added). This provision is largely toothless, however, as the
majors have all had formal ethical rules and internal conflict-of-interest controls for years,
none of which prevented either the recent ratings disasters nor the gross abuses of the
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The hope is that ratings criteria will continue to be developed privately by
market institutions and that the discipline of competition will improve not
only the price of ratings but also their substantive quality. Although new
amendments to these rules have been adopted1 45 and others remain
pending, 46 the major goal remains merely to increase competition, leaving
both the development of ratings methodology and the judgment of
particular CROs' performance to the market.1
47
Competition as a solution will not work. Admittedly, effective price
competition may at least bring down ratings fees and encourage some
greater concern for quality, but several major problems suggest that
CRARA's approach will be of little value. First, licensing more NRSROs
does not result in more competition. Those second-tier firms that managed
to get pre-CRARA designation were just acquired by the majors in a
relatively quick fashion. 148 Competition authorities have seen little reason
structured-finance era. Neither CRARA nor the implementing regulations require any
safeguards beyond those the majors already have in place.
145. See Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations, 74 Fed. Reg. 6,456 (Feb. 9, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 &
249b) (amendments by SEC that went into effect in April 2009).
146. Proposals are still pending that would require ratings of structured securities either
to use special ratings symbols or be published along with written reports, see Nationally
Recognized Statistical Ratings Organizations, 73 Fed. Reg. 36,212 (proposed June 25,
2008), and, more significantly, proposals that would remove the use of the NRSRO
references in securities regulations. See Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations, 74 Fed. Reg. at 6,456 n.1 (referencing the several notices
of proposed rulemaking in which these changes were proposed).
147. Specifically, the SEC's April 2009 amendments, see supra note 145, focus heavily
on mandatory disclosures by the CROs of the accuracy of their own ratings over time.
Commentators have urged such a requirement for some time, but it bears repeating that the
Commission only requires disclosure of this information. It will remain for markets to
determine whether to punish a given CRO for its bad performance, and no such thing has
ever occurred, despite the many scandalous instances of poor CRO performance. Moreover,
empirical evidence has existed for several decades examining the performance of the
various CROs, and often explicitly comparing them. See supra notes 97-103. There is no
reason to doubt that an empirical study of their performance will be any less available in the
foreseeable future.
Admittedly, the new amendments and those still pending would add some other
protections, including enhanced record-keeping requirements that might aid the
Commission's increased examination efforts since the subprime meltdown. But it is hard to
imagine that the added disclosure, record keeping, and conflict-of-interest rules will
materially alter the internal rules that the CROs already maintain or the modest, additional
requirements imposed by CRARA and the Commission's initial rules.
148. Even before CRARA, the SEC granted the designation to several firms outside of
the three major firms, but each firm was either acquired or combined with another CRO
within a few years, and all of them wound up eventually joining a major CRO. The Duff &
Phelps firm, which was designated in 1982, and McCarthy, Cristani & Maffei, designated in
1983, merged in 1991 and then were acquired by Fitch in 2000. Thompson BankWatch,
which enjoyed a limited designation for bank issues since 1992, was "upgraded" to general-
purpose designation in 1999 and then almost immediately it too was acquired by Fitch in
2000. IBCA, a London-based firm, received limited designation for bank issues in 1997 and
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to stop these moves, and one anticipates that given the authorities' basic
theoretical approach to merger enforcement, the CRARA-engendered
increase in the number of NRSROs will make it even easier for future
acquisitions. While it is too early to predict the outcome of the CRARA
experiment, there is no particular reason to believe those newly licensed
NRSROs will not simply be acquired and will never meaningfully decrease
concentration in the industry. Likewise, CRARA impliedly assumes that
NRSRO designation is the market's only significant entry barrier. But
smaller firms and new entrants face the significant problem of developing
the very reputational capital that current NRSROs claim to be so central to
their continued operation.
149
Next, even if CRARA or some other legislative innovation managed to
inject some price competition, there is no particular reason to believe that it
will improve the quality of ratings. Competing CROs have existed for
many years, both here and overseas, and while they are mainly much
smaller than the major CROs, most of them do not charge issuer fees.
150
Until recently none of them were NRSROs, and so all they had to sell to
their subscribers was information in competition with the majors. Many of
these firms rate large percentages of issues throughout bond markets or
within particular segments. Given their numbers, the breadth of their
coverage, and the major CROs' poor performance of the past few decades,
some of those firms should have had some opportunity to outperform the
major CROs. And given the speedy dissemination of information in capital
markets, that superior information would have been widely available. Yet,
the existence of that competition has had no discernable impact on the
performance of the majors.
But finally, one completely different and possibly very significant
problem with competition as a solution-especially as it is embodied in
CRARA, which simply increases the number of firms entitled to sell
NRSRO regulatory licenses to bond issuers-is that it will likely decrease
the quality of ratings. In their role as NRSROs, the agencies act literally as
regulators because issuers will adjust their behavior to standards devised by
CROs if they deem it necessary for a desired rating. A nicely documented
historical record shows that where regulators share overlapping oversight
of the same regulated entities, they will often "compete" for their subjects'
then combined with Fitch in 1997. See White, supra note 5, at 46.
149. See TECHNICAL COMM., INT'L ORG. OF SECS. COMM'NS, REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES
OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 14-15 (2003), available at
www.fsa.go.jp/inter/ios/20030930/05.pdf, for an explanation of this problem.
150. As of 2003, the IOSCO Technical Committee found that dozens of overseas CROs
were neither affiliated with the majors nor charging issuer fees. See id. at 9.
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"business" by loosening their standards, I5 1 and there is emerging empirical
evidence that increased competition among CROs leads to ratings that are
more "issuer friendly.'
' 52
C. International and Self-Regulatory Initiatives
Intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations studying the
problem have settled on one particular solution: the CROs' voluntary
adoption of a hortatory code recently promulgated by International
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and the International
Group of Treasury Associations (IGTA). 153 Rules of this nature, however,
were not made to work, which is made evident by the fact that all of the
major CROs implemented the IOSCO code by early 2007, well before the
day on which the major CROs inaugurated the subprime meltdown.
154
Thus, even after their adoption of these codes, the majors rated extremely
risky instruments very highly, in spite of evidence that they lacked
confidence in their own ratings, and they did so under clear pecuniary
conflicts of interest. 155 Moreover, general hortatory conduct rules focusing
on transparency and independence are beside the point in light of CRARA
151. In a careful study, Steven Ramirez showed that banks, in particular, who have long
had their choice among various federal and state regulators, have played those regulators
against one another, encouraging "regulatory competition" to achieve the most favorable
regulation. See Steven A. Ramirez, Depoliticizing Financial Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 503 (2000). As he notes, regulatory experts recognized this problem as early as
1949. Id. at 534 (discussing U.S. COMM'N ON THE ORG. OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE
GOV'T, THE HOOVER COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE
GOVERNMENT (1949)). Other observers, prominently including the General Accounting
Office, have, for this reason, urged consolidation of financial regulatory authorities for
many years. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BANK OVERSIGHT: FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES FOR MODERNIZING THE U.S. STRUCTURE 3-4 (1996). In the context of the CROs,
the lack of meaningful government oversight or public accountability renders the regulatory
competition problem potentially even more serious. For investigatory evidence of the
CROs' "race to the bottom," see SEC 2008 STAFF REPORT, supra note 3.
152. Bo Becker & Todd Milbourn, Reputation and Competition: Evidence from the
Credit Rating Industry (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 09-051, 2008). An excellent
example is that in one of the rare well-documented instances of actual head-to-head
competition among major CROs, Fitch managed to steal substantial early market share in
structured ratings. For a time, it was considered the dominant CRO in that niche. There is
reason to believe Fitch competed not on price but by lowering its rating standards, and that
Moody's and S&P responded by lowering theirs. See Bolton et al., supra note 10 (reaching
a similar result in a game theoretic model); Skreta & Veldkamp, supra note 10, at 22.
153. See supra notes 5-6.
154. See TECHNICAL COMM., INT'L ORG. OF SECS. COMM'NS, REVIEW OF
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IOSCO FUNDAMENTALS OF A CODE OF CONDUCT FOR CREDIT
RATING AGENCIES 13 (2007). Though the majors did not adopt the IOSCO code verbatim,
the Technical Committee found that each of them had "strongly implemented" almost all of
it in their internal ethical codes. Id.
155. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (describing CROs' roles in the creation
of the credit crisis).
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and its implementing regulations, which already mandate such things, and
will have no effect in any event.
D. Civil Liability
Even if existing U.S. and international regulatory rules do not work,
CROs might be made to perform better through more successful ex ante
lawsuits. But, as Partnoy points out, "[t]he only common element" in
lawsuits challenging CROs for incompetence or malfeasance "is that the
rating agencies win." 156 This has been partly for the First Amendment
reasons stated above, but as we will now show, even without that
protection, they would remain substantially underconstrained for
substantive legal reasons, both under the handful of theories that have
actually been brought against them and as to other theories we were able to
devise.
1. Federal Securities Regulation
The only major federal securities laws that could be relevant are the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (IAA) 157 and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (Exchange Act).' 58 First, the CROs were traditionally subject to
the IAA and appeared to comply with it without too much complaint,
59
even though a 1985 Supreme Court ruling probably exempts them from it
for First Amendment reasons.1 60 But more recently, CRARA amended the
Act to explicitly exempt NRSROs from coverage unless they issued
recommendations on purchasing, selling, or holding securities.' 61 In any
case, subjecting them to IAA liability would not be a desirable course of
action, both because of the burden on the SEC 162 and because of the fact
that most CRO ratings are not the type of personalized investment advice
156. Partnoy, supra note 10, at 79.
157. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 (2006).
158. Id. §§ 78a-78oo (2006). The Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) is not terribly
relevant. Securities Act Rule 436(g)(1) exempts NRSROs from § 11 liability, and while
§ 17(a) has language similar to the anti-fraud provisions of Exchange Act Rule I Ob-5, § 17(a)
applies only to "sellers" of securities.
159. See Memorandum from Anette L. Nazareth to William H. Donaldson, Chairman,
SEC (June 4, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/ratingagency/baker060403.pdf.
160. See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181 (1985) (holding that a completely disinterested
publication regularly offered to the general public falls within the 15 U.S.C. § 80b-
2(a)(I 1)(D) exception to Advisors Act coverage).
161. See Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, § 4(b)(3)(B),
120 Stat. 1329 (2006) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(1i)).
162. The SEC has sole authority to enforce most provisions of the Investment Advisors
Act. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 14 (1979).
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that the Act seeks to regulate.
1 63
Second, parties might seek liability under Exchange Act § 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5.1 64 However, a major hurdle will be proof of "a mental state
embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud,"1 65 which at summary
judgment must be shown by a "strong" inference.166 As Partnoy observes,
the ratings are "extensively disclaimed and not ... recommendation[s] to
buy, sell or hold securities. ' ' 67 Without proof that a CRO had knowledge
that would have changed the issued rating, it will not be liable for § 10(b)
violations.
2. Antitrust
The level of concentration in the U.S. ratings industry might seem to call
for an antitrust solution, and for that reason CRARA includes a
competition-policy approach. Not only have market watchers suggested an
antitrust solution, but the Justice Department once almost brought suit,
168
some others have sued, 169 and one state attorney general's federal antitrust
suit remains pending. 
170
Antitrust will not work. First, a technical problem will confront antitrust
claims before courts even reach the merits. There is a fairly solid chance
that CRARA's oversight of the industry, and especially its evident
insistence on expanded competition, actually preempts antitrust litigation
163. See generally Lowe, 472 U.S. at 190-91, 204, 207-08 (discussing the reasons why
the Act was crafted).
164. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2008). Private claims have
been brought against CROs as aiders and abettors of § 10(b) fraud, but the Supreme Court
has twice shut the door on this theory. In Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 179-80, 190-91 (1994), the Court held that there is no private
right of action for aiding and abetting a § 10(b) violation. The issue was raised again after
the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which gave the SEC
authority to prosecute aiders and abettors of § 10(b) violations, and the Court again held that
there was no private right of action. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta,
Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 768-69 (2008). The SEC may still prosecute such aiders and abettors,
as § 104 of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 gives the SEC authority to
do so. Pub. L. No. 104-67, §104, 109 Stat. 737, 757 (1995) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78t (2006)).
165. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193, 194 n.12 (1976).
166. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007) ("To qualify as
'strong' ... we hold, an inference of scienter must be more than merely plausible or
reasonable-it must be cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference .... ").
167. Partnoy, supra note 10, at 79. Opinions can be actionable as § 10(b) fraudulent
statements, but it must be shown that the speaker does not believe the opinion and that the
opinion is not well-founded. See, e.g., Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 638-39 (6th Cir.
1993); In re Nat'l Century Fin. Enters., Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 630, 644 (S.D. Ohio 2008).
168. See supra note 8.
169. See id. (discussing Jefferson County Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody's Investor's
Servs., Inc., 175 F.3d 848 (10th Cir. 1999)).
170. See id. (discussing the pending suit by the Connecticut Attorney General).
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entirely."' Even if it does not, an antitrust suit might also be fairly hard to
bring as a substantive matter. Section 2 monopolization seems the only
likely angle of attack because there is no obvious collaborative conduct,
17 2
and it is not clear that even the majors' massive market shares would
support such a claim. Moreover, with the exception of some conduct by
Moody's that appears to have abated,173 it is hard to imagine how a plaintiff
could establish the "exclusionary conduct" element of that cause of action.
The major CROs will likely argue that their market power comes largely
from government incorporation of their ratings. Of course, a Clayton Act
§ 7 challenge to any of the many acquisitions that have kept the major
171. Where a federal statute makes clear Congress's intent that antitrust not apply to
some particular activity, even in the absence of explicit language in the statute, a court may
hold that antitrust is "implied[ly] repealed" as to that activity. In fact, in four leading
opinions, the Supreme Court has held antitrust impliedly repealed as to securities markets by
prevailing federal securities law. See Credit Suisse Secs. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S.
264, 275 (2007); Gordon v. NYSE, 422 U.S. 659, 682, 685-86 (1975); United States v.
Nat'l Ass'n of Secs. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 734 (1975); Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341,
357, 371 (1963). By the Court's prevailing standard, antitrust will be held repealed as to
some given activity if the antitrust complaint and the other federal law are "clearly
incompatible." Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 275-76. The Credit Suisse Court, which
considered this standard in the context of antitrust liability for conduct also subject to SEC
regulation, strongly implied that there could be clear incompatibility wherever an antitrust
complaint challenged activity that even someday might be subject to SEC regulation, merely
authorizing conduct that otherwise would violate antitrust. Id. The SEC has power under
CRARA to "prohibit any act or practice ...the Commission determines to be unfair,
coercive, or abusive," and has already used it to prohibit certain anticompetitive practices
that might otherwise have been evidence for a § 2 monopolization plaintiff of "exclusionary
conduct." See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(i)(1); 17 C.F.R. § 2 4 0.1 7g- 6 (a). Moreover, while the
SEC's rulemaking power under § 78o-7(i) contains an explicit "savings clause" that
preserves antitrust authority-that is, Congress directed that CRARA's oversight of the
industry was not meant to "impliedly" repeal antitrust as to the CROs, see 15 U.S.C. §78o-
7(i)(2)--in the recent past the Supreme Court has read similar clauses completely out of
existence. In Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 411-15 (2004), the Court considered a § 2 monopolization claim against a phone
company that refused to provide nondiscriminatory access to its phone-line facilities, despite
a requirement in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to do so. That Act even contained a
savings clause providing that "nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall
be construed to modify, impair, or supersede the applicability of any of the antitrust laws."
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, § 601, 110 Stat. 56, 143 (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 152 note (2006)). The Court nevertheless refused to entertain
plaintiff's antitrust claim on the ground that the Telecommunications Act already contained
provisions mandating competition, weighing the costs and unlikely benefits that the Court
believed to be promised by the § 2 claim. Verizon, 540 U.S. at 411-15. The Court said this
was appropriate, noting, "[The] regulatory structure [was] designed to deter and remedy
anticompetitive harm.... [W]here, by contrast, '[tihere is nothing built into the regulatory
scheme which performs the antitrust function,' the benefits of antitrust are worth its
sometimes considerable disadvantages." Id. at 412 (citation omitted).
172. Without some evidence of an anticompetitive agreement, neither § 1 nor § 2
conspiracy to monopolize liability will be available. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2006).
173. Specifically, Moody's apparently agreed with the Justice Department to no longer
use unsolicited ratings as a punishment to issuers for failure to seek a Moody's rating. See
supra note 8.
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CROs in a dominant position would require no exclusionary-conduct
showing, and concentration in the industry ought to be large enough at least
to raise Clayton Act concerns. Still, not only have all domestic CRO
acquisitions of the past several years received regulatory approval, but they
were almost all acquisitions by Fitch or even smaller firms. Fitch remains
a distant third-place challenger to Moody's and S&P, and the associated
increases in concentration may be too small to challenge.
But more importantly, there is no especially promising reason to believe
that even successful litigation against the CROs would remedy any
problems of real concern. The best long-term benefit from any potential
antitrust litigation would be increased price competition. For all the
reasons mentioned in connection with CRARA, the entry of more CROs
will not necessarily ensure either meaningful price competition or more
accurate ratings.
3. State Law
State government regulation of CROs essentially does not exist, but if it
did, it would face problems. CRARA specifically preempts all state or
local registration, licensing, or qualification requirements for NRSROs.
174
Although states can investigate and bring enforcement actions against
NRSROs for fraud or deceit, 175 CRARA also preempts any state or local
regulation that regulates the "substance of credit ratings or the procedures
and methodologies" NRSROs use to determine ratings. 176 And given the
international scope of the problem, state-by-state regulation hardly seems
desirable. Prospective state-level regulation might also face the problem of
CRO "retaliation" in that CROs might refuse to rate products originating in
states with laws unfriendly to those products. This happened in Georgia in
2002 when that state passed an anti-predatory lending law. 
177
Issuers or investors might raise any number of state law tort claims to
challenge inaccurate ratings. However, willful violations-such as
defamation, fraud, and the like-would be difficult to prove in all but the
most extreme cases 178 and may also be barred by the First Amendment.
179
174. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(o)(1) (2006).
175. Id. § 78o-7(o)(2).
176. Id. § 78o-7(c)(2).
177. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 109, at 2099; Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory
Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REv. 2185, 2243-44 (2007); see also C. Lincoln
Combs, Comment, Banking Law and Regulation: Predatory Lending in Arizona, 38 ARIz.
ST. L.J. 617, 628-29 (2006) (discussing the CROs' influence over a state anti-predatory
lending law in Georgia).
178. Fraud claims encounter the same issues as Rule lOb-5 claims-the proof of
scienter. That is, it is difficult to prove that CROs intended to defraud, because it is difficult
to show that CROs had actual knowledge of some fact that would have changed the rating
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Negligence claims, such as negligent misrepresentation, have a better
chance of surviving until trial but only in limited situations. 180  Generally
speaking the courts have found CROs owe no duty of care toward third-
party investors when making ratings announcements public.181
VI. LIKELY FUTURE UNREGULABILITY
A. Real Free-Market Solutions: Adopt Investor-Pays or Displace
Intermediation Altogether
One solution is to get the CROs more or less out of the credit rating
business. Markets themselves generate information, and public capital
markets are thought to do it fairly efficiently. Thus, probably the best
known CRO-reform proposal is Frank Partnoy's long-standing
recommendation to remove the CROs from any regulatory role. He would
retain both private and public portfolio rules for institutional investors, but
would replace NRSRO ratings with yield spreads, which, he says, are
already readily available and should in principle measure risk at least as
well as the CROs or any other analytical intermediary.
182
Although removing regulatory reliance upon credit ratings is an
important first step, a significant problem with Partnoy's solution is that
calculating and implementing enforceable yield spreads will be more
difficult than Partnoy implies. But more significant is his strong, implicit
assigned to the debt issue. There has been some success suing CROs for fraud and
negligent misrepresentation, but only in the most egregious cases. For example, when
CROs conspire with hedge funds to provide false reports to depress issuer equity pricing,
they may "step[] over the line into defamation and other torts." See Overstock.com, Inc. v.
Gradient Analytics, Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 29, 33-34 (2007) (denying defendant's motion to
strike the complaint).
179. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text; see also Sagers, supra note 134.
180. See, e.g., In re Nat'l Century Fin. Enters., Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 630, 646-49 (S.D.
Ohio 2008) (denying Moody's and Fitch's motions to dismiss claims for negligent
misrepresentation when ratings were issued for a private placement and were assigned
without the exercise of reasonable care).
181. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
182. See Partnoy, supra note 11, at 624. One issue with relying on spreads instead of
ratings is that spreads can vary significantly due to macroeconomic factors, just as they have
in the wake of the recession of 2008. This is likely due to the fact that bond prices include
more information than credit risk, which is supposed to be the sole concern of credit ratings.
See generally Kose John et al., Credit Ratings, Collateral, and Loan Characteristics:
Implications for Yield, 76 J. Bus. 371 (2003); Edwin Elton et al., Explaining the Rate Spread
on Corporate Bonds, 56 J. FIN. 247 (2001); Edwin Elton et al., Factors Affecting the
Valuation of Corporate Bonds, 28 J. BANKING & FIN. 2747 (2004). A related suggestion,
which would replace a simple letter-grade credit rating with underlying assumptions or
market measures such as the assumed default probability, loss given default, etc., would
likely have the same effect as removing credit ratings from regulation, because categories of
ratings would become more complex and less clearly defined as "investment grade."
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free-market confidence. Despite what he implies, markets have sometimes
measured risk poorly as it has with respect to the present crisis. However
significant the role of the CROs and regulatory failures or any other
particular factor may have been, one failure originating purely in capital
markets themselves made a major contribution: long-standing,
systematically underpriced risk premia.' 83 There is no particular reason to
believe that such a thing will not happen again.
A related suggestion to better harness incentives is to keep private
intermediaries but mandate a return to an investor-pays business model.
Investors might be better trusted to decide how much information to buy.
They would pose neither the agency costs of the current system (corporate
managers might pay for more than an efficient amount of analytical
services) nor conflicting interests. Furthermore, they might better penalize
intermediaries that perform poorly. The problem will be overcoming the
tremendous free-riding and collective-action problems it would pose, which
may have led to the issuer-pays system. Some means would have to be
devised by which individual investors could fund analysis by pooling their
resources for it at low cost while overcoming the public-goods nature of the
information they purchase. Devising such a system seems extremely
complex and rife with uncertainties that are presently unknown and
possibly unknowable. For instance, the voucher system proposed by Choi
and Fisch raises more questions than answers, despite their long, elegant,
and detailed treatment of the system.' 84 Such a system seems complex and
costly enough to raise the question as to why it would not be better just to
have the government act as the intermediary.' 85
B. Other Market Solutions, Sort of" Skin in the Game and Investor-
Controlled CROs
Another market-based solution would be to retain an intermediary's
analysis in portfolio rules, but to require that entity to have some stake in
all the securities it rates. Obvious and critical problems would infect any
proposal under which CROs themselves take pecuniary interests in rated
183. See FSF 2008 REPORT, supra note 5, at 5-6.
184. See generally Choi & Fisch, supra note 14, at 314-44. Other suggestions for
altering payment models pose similar difficulties. For example, one proposal that ratings be
paid out of bond coupons poses a pair of problems. It may discourage CROs from rating
debt that is below investment-grade because full ratings fees would not necessarily be paid
when debt defaults. It may also encourage CROs to deflate ratings to increase the amount
or the rate at which they get paid, due to the larger coupon. For obvious reasons, it may also
discourage CROs from rating long-term debt, or raising the costs of rating such debt, due to
the increased probability of default over short-term debt.
185. See infra notes 195-98 and accompanying text.
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firms,1 86 but one more-elegant alternative would be to do away with ratings
as such and instead give the job to insurers. Any such proposal would
presumably resemble the Enron-era suggestion of Sean Ronen, an NYU
accounting professor, that a system of "financial statement insurance"
replace the auditing of publicly disclosed financial statements., 87 There is
some reason to believe that parties with more skin in the game outpredict
those who have less to lose. For example, some tentative empirical results
show that professional short sellers have outperformed the market in
predicting corporate accounting restatements. 
1 88
A solution proposed by Stanford law professor Joseph Grundfest at a
recent SEC Roundtable event on CROs would involve the creation and
mandatory utilization of investor-owned and controlled CROs (LOC
CROs).189 Issuers would continue to pay for credit ratings, but in addition
to the ratings they purchase now, they would have to pay for an IOC CRO
to rate their issue as well. This model, which is reminiscent of the
independent research requirement of the Global Legal Settlement following
the recent accounting scandals, would not solve the significant lack of price
competition in the CRO market. While it would ensure that the major
CROs have a counterpart that would be designed to have an opposing bias,
it is not clear that this would improve the quality of ratings sufficiently to
justify the added expense.
But there remains a major problem with both ideas, at least until there is
better empirical evidence on how self-motivated market observers work
and when they are likely to fail. Major players with plenty of skin in
various games performed very poorly both in the present crisis and in other
recent ones. Large institutional investors, for example, have expertise and
186. Namely, (1) the intermediary would then have much bigger conflicts of interest,
and (2) the major CROs rate far too many issues for them to invest in each one.
187. Ronen first suggested the idea in a New York Times op-ed piece. Joshua Ronen,
Op-Ed., A Market Solution to the Accounting Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2002, at A21. This
was later elaborated with two coauthors. Alex Dontoh et al., Financial Statements Insurance
2 (NYU Stern Sch. of Bus., Working Paper, 2004), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=303784.
188. See COFFEE, supra note 14, at 35-36 & n.76 (discussing evidence that a particular
short-selling firm predicted the Enron collapse before any other observer and citing
preliminary empirical evidence of similar performances by other short sellers).
189. See SEC, Transcript of Roundtable to Examine Oversight of Credit Rating
Agencies 192-204 (April 15, 2009) (remarks of Joseph Grundfest), available at http://www.
sec.gov/spotlight/cra-oversight-roundtable/cra-oversight-roundtable-transcript.txt. A
different restriction arising from the accounting scandal at the turn of the century, requiring
firms to rotate their use of accounting agencies, could effectively create some price
competition. Requiring issuers to use a CRO for no longer than a limited period of years,
then subsequently preventing them from using that CRO for the same number of years,
could foster a cottage CRO industry. Of course, it could also just encourage issuers to
alternate between the major CROs and do away with the two-ratings norm for every issue.
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maintain their own in-house analytical capacity. Yet they failed to predict
the subprime meltdown; indeed, they consumed securitized subprime assets
voraciously right up until Pearl Harbor Day. Admittedly, there are reasons
to believe that some institutional fund managers might continue buying a
security even when they predict that it is overpriced,1 90 but in this case they
failed to heed plenty of advance warning of very dire consequences.
Other sophisticated investors made this same mistake. American
International Group (AIG) and others exposed themselves extensively
through guaranteeing a "non-insurance" subsidiary's credit default swaps
(CDSs). Indeed, the massive wave of RMBS downgrades was the
triggering event in numerous AIG CDSs, which eventually led to
government intervention to keep AIG afloat. Similarly, insurers who
provided credit enhancements to RMBS pools by insuring pieces of them
were taken by surprise when default rates soared. Thus, it is not clear that
replacing CROs with insurance companies would materially improve risk
estimation.1 91
C. The Last Market Solution, We Promise: Internalize Risk Externalities
It is commonly thought that the moment after a regulation takes effect
the private sector finds ways around it. As discussed, some attribute
financial innovation itself as merely a response to regulation. When
markets practice this avoidance behavior, regulations should seek to align
market incentives to encourage the market to police itself. This course of
action has worked most effectively in the regulation of financing consumer
purchases of goods and services, where the government has placed liability
on loan purchasers to ensure that they police the individuals from whom
they purchased loans.
In the CRO market, the entities that could exert the necessary pressure
on CROs are limited to the investment banks that select which CRO will
rate the debt issues they underwrite. It is unclear if making debt
underwriters liable to investors for overinflated ratings will have the
desired corrective effect. While loan purchasers in consumer markets had
knowledge of the unlawful practices of loan originators, debt underwriters
may have little knowledge of or control over the underlying assumptions
the CROs use in their quantitative modes that lead to overinflated ratings.
There is one obvious benefit of this proposal: it should limit the effect of
the conflict of interest that leads to ratings inflation by forcing underwriters
to bear a corresponding cost for such actions.
190. See supra note 121 and accompanying text (discussing evidence of "herding").
191. A fortiori, Partnoy's suggestion that reliance be made on the market for CDSs
seems, in light of recent events, too risky. See Partnoy, supra note 11, at 679.
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This upstream liability would have an interesting effect on financial
innovation by counterbalancing the underwriter's financial incentive to sell
as much as possible with the potential cost of liability. The problem is that
risks of liability imposed by way of federal securities law have failed
massively during the past few decades, and it is not clear whether they ever
much improved capital market efficiency even when enforcement worked
better. Moreover, while underwriter liability should prevent the reckless
adoption of financial innovations, it has the downside of likely increasing
the cost of innovation.
D. Anti-market Solutions: Substance Regulation or Outright Socialization
ofAnalytical Intermediation
An obvious approach is simply to increase the regulation of CROs and,
in particular, to regulate the substance of what they do. This has never
been done before, and for the time being, the primary CRO regulator is
prohibited by federal statute from doing so-at least as to the NRSROs,
CRARA prohibits it. 192 But the air presumably is ripe for some reversal on
that point and suggestions abound for it. The Congressional Oversight
Panel, for example, made a comparatively drastic recommendation. The
Panel proposed a public "Credit Rating Review Board" that could "sign off
on any rating before it took on regulatory significance"-that is, before it
would have the effect that NRSRO ratings have currently.
93
The problem is that even in light of the current window during which
regulation might be politically feasible, the Panel's recommendation would
be extremely expensive and duplicative. The majors each rate on the order
of 20,000 new issues per year, and the Credit Rating Review Board would
presumably have to duplicate their work to some large extent. Under such
a scheme, the natural question would be why the government does not
simply do the job itself. Alternative oversight schemes that would be less
costly because of reduced scope of oversight would be substantially less
effective. For example, the Congressional Oversight Panel alternatively
suggested structuring its Review Board as a licensure and oversight body,
like the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). 194 But
PCAOB has hardly been a model of regulatory success.
That then leaves what is probably the least politically feasible
192. CRARA provides, "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, neither the
Commission nor any State (or political subdivision thereof) may regulate the substance of
credit ratings or the procedures and methodologies by which any nationally recognized
statistical rating organization determines credit ratings." 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c)(2) (2006).
193. COP REPORT 2009, supra note 4, at 44.
194. See id.
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alternative, which may be undesirable for other reasons: the government
itself might simply rate private debt-either in competition with the CROs
or in legally preemptive usurpation of them. 195  One benefit of a
government informational intermediary is that it could charge user fees to
issuers or investors, thereby solving both the public-goods nature of
informational producers and the agency-cost problems sometimes said to
affect intermediary services.' 96
Even aside from its patent absurdity from a political perspective-this
solution would entail essentially killing off a multibillion-dollar industry
and would be greeted as outright socialist treachery-a government
informational intermediary would require a very costly new apparatus.
Also, whatever might be its other costs and benefits, this approach is at
odds with two other existing federal policies. First, the federal government
has essentially prohibited itself from making any new "standard" where a
"voluntary consensus standard" is available from the private sector that
would do the job.197 Likewise, by executive order dating to the Eisenhower
Administration, the White House has consistently prohibited federal
agencies from producing goods or services in competition with those
available in the private sector. The policy is now codified federal law.1
98
195. See, e.g., White, supra note 10, at 14-15; Roger Lowenstein, Triple-A Failure:
How Moody's and Other Credit-Rating Agencies Licensed the Abuses that Created the
Housing Bubble-and Bust, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2008, (Magazine), at 36, 39, 41 (stating
that by adopting the NRSRO approach, "[i]n effect, the government outsourced its
regulatory function to three for-profit companies" and suggesting that "if the Fed or other
regulators want[] to restrict what sort of bonds could be owned by... anyone ... in need of
protection, they would have to do it themselves-not farm the job out to Moody's").
196. See Choi & Fisch, supra note 14, at 317-18.
197. Though the policy had various antecedents going back several years, it was
formalized in the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. No.
104-113, § 12(d), 110 Stat. 775, 783 (1996) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 272 note
(2006)), and implemented by Federal Participation in the Development and Use of
Voluntary Consensus Standards and in Conformity Assessment Activities, 63 Fed. Reg.
8,546, 8,553 (Feb. 19, 1998). See also supra note 137 and accompanying text. See
generally Sagers, Twilight, supra note 133.
198. The policy originated in an order of the Bureau of the Budget (predecessor to the
Office of Management and Budget) under Eisenhower. See BUREAU OF THE BUDGET,
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BULLETIN No. 55-4 (1955) ("[T]he Federal
Government will not start or carry on any commercial activity to provide a service or
product for its own use if such product or service can be procured from private enterprise
through ordinary business channels."). It has been in force continuously since then, codified
for some decades now in OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-76 (2003), and
supplemented by the Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-270,
112 Stat. 2382 (1998) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 501 note (2006)). Its current
thrust is that (1) federal agencies may never engage in "commercial" activities where the
good or service in question is available from the private sector, and (2) they must conduct
periodic reviews of their in-house activities to determine whether any of them ought to be
farmed out. See generally Steven L. Schooner, Competitive Sourcing Policy: More Sail
than Rudder?, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 263, 271-73 & n.39 (2004).
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TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS
Two policy objectives now dominating the CRO debate are to reduce
systemic risk and to improve capital-market pricing efficiency. Those
goals are not currently being met. There is no reason, given the nature of
their business model and the financial pressures they face, to believe that
the CROs will at any foreseeable time be able to operate on an issuer-pays
basis without significant conflicting pecuniary interest. Furthermore, there
is no reason to expect the substantive quality of their work to improve in
such a material way that catastrophic failures like the present one will not
occur again soon. Moreover, there is no reason at present to expect that
any policies currently in place-including those voluntarily adopted by the
CROs, those required by CRARA and its implementing regulations, and
civil liability rules enforceable by private plaintiffs or government
enforcers-will achieve either of these goals. For these reasons, it is
imperative that policymakers end their regulatory reliance upon the CROs,
even though doing so will not fix the CRO market.
It seems likely that some significant regulatory change will come fairly
soon. Also, given the small number of major CROs and that several major
intergovernmental bodies have worked on this in close collaboration-the
SEC, the U.S. Congressional Oversight Panel, the Basel Committee's
Technical Committee, the International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO), the Committee of European Securities Regulators,
the International Group of Treasury Associations (IGTA), and so on-it
seems likely that whatever will happen will be internationally coordinated.
Therefore, the most likely outcome is that a code consisting of the IOSCO
and IGTA codes will be internationally adopted. Those rules will be
augmented by some regulatory enhancements in the United States. But
given that the SEC has already proposed somewhat tougher new
regulations under CRARA t 99 and has not requested new statutory authority,
the likely U.S. response will simply be a tightening of existing rules to
increase competition and improve transparency. We may see adoption of a
CRO oversight body set up like the PCAOB, but it is hard to imagine its
role will be anything more than a fairly passive one.
The analysis here suggests that these likely reforms will not be terribly
successful. Capital asset pricing should be roughly as efficient as it was
before. More importantly, none of these reforms has much hope of reining
in the systemic risk of which we have already been victims, and
importantly, they do nothing directly to constrain another CRO-issuer
199. See Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 73 Fed. Reg. 36,212
(proposed June 25, 2008) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249b).
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partnership in lucrative innovative products like those of the structured
finance era. But the analysis here also suggests that it may be quite hard to
devise any regulatory approach that could constrain these sorts of problems
without posing high costs and inviting new and unforeseen problems of its
own. More-radical solutions have problems of political infeasibility. In
short, capital markets currently contain a much more serious institutional
flaw than has been recognized.
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